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Introduction
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp.,' the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs who challenged an exclusionary
zoning decision under the Equal Protection Clause were required to prove that
racial purpose was a motivating factor in the defendant's decision.2 The Court
concluded that the "finding that the Village's decision carried a discriminatory
'ultimate effect' is without independent constitutional significance," 3 but it
remanded the case for a determination of whether this discriminatory effect
alone would violate the Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968).' On remand, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that
the Fair Housing Act claim should be sustained if "the Village's refusal to rezone
effectively precluded plaintiffs from constructing low-cost housing within Arlington Heights,"' because "at least under some circumstances a violation of [Title
VIII] can be established by a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing
of discriminatory intent."'
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of whether discriminatory effect or discriminatory purpose is the proper measure of a Fair Housing
Act case, and the courts of appeals are divided on the issue. The Seventh
Circuit's opinion in Arlington Heights relied on two decisions of the Eighth
Circuit holding that Title VIII prohibits housing practices with discriminatory
effects,7 and the Third Circuit adopted the same position in a decision that came
down after Arlington Heights.8 Taking the opposing view, the Sixth Circuit has
rejected an effect test in an exclusionary zoning case similar to Arlington
Heights,' and the Fourth Circuit has also indicated, in a split decision, that it
considers proof of discriminatory intent to be required in a Title VIII case." The
Second Circuit has produced conflicting decisions. 1 Even among the courts of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1967, Amherst; J.D., 1970,
Harvard; Chief Trial Counsel, Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities,
1972-75.
1 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
2 In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976), which the year before had held that proof of discriminatory purpose was necessary
to establish an equal protection claim of racial discrimination in the context of public employment. See generally Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 ILL. L. FORUM 961 (1977).
3 429 U.S. at 270.
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1970).
5 Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d
1283, 1295 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
6 Id. at 1290.
7 Smith v. Anchor Building Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. City of
Black Jack, Missouri, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
8 Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
908 (1978).
9 Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo, 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and
remanded, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977) ; 558 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985
(1978).
10 Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1973).
11 Compare Boyd v. Lefrak Organization, 509 F.2d 1110 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 896 (1975) with Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108
(2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971). See also Citizens Committee for Faraday
Wood v. Lindsay, 507 F.2d 1065 (2nd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975); Acevedo
v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078 (2nd Cir. 1974).
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appeals that have agreed that a showing of discriminatory effect establishes a
prima facie case under the Fair Housing Act, there have been differences about
the nature of the defendant's burden of justification that should result from such
a showing. 2
One of the reasons that the circuits have split in deciding whether an effect
test should govern Title VIII cases is that they have differed over the extent to
which the standards developed by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co." and other employment discrimination decisions should be extended to housing cases. Griggs held that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196414 prohibits

job requirements that have the effect of discriminating against blacks, even if they
are adopted without any discriminatory motive. The Seventh Circuit in Arlington Heights relied heavily on Griggs and the similarities between the employment
and housing discrimination statutes to hold that proof of discriminatory intent
is also unnecessary under Title VIII." On the other hand, the Second Circuit's
opinion in Boyd v. Lefrak Organization announced that Griggs "has never been

applied in any Fair Housing Act case, either public or private, and we find it to
be inapposite here." 6 It seems apparent that the Supreme Court will eventually
have to resolve this conflict and decide whether the discriminatory effect standard

of Griggs will apply to cases brought under Title VIII, but the Court has thus
far shown no inclination to undertake this task.'"
In the meantime, the importance of the question is growing. The national
commitment to fair housing made by Congress in Title VIII is yet to be fulfilled.' 8 Widespread housing discrimination is still a common phenomenon, "
and residential segregation is actually more prevalent now than when the Fair
Housing Act was passed a decade ago.' " Title VIII has now emerged as the
principal weapon for challenging exclusionary land use decisions by local municipalities in federal court." On the private side, landlords, realtors, and others
12 Cf. 564 F.2d 126; 558 F.2d 1283; 508 F.2d 1179.
13 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
14 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 17 (1970).
15 558 F.2d at 1288-89.
16 509 F.2d 1110, 1114 (2nd Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975).
17 The Supreme Court has denied certiorari in a number of cases in which this issue could
have been decided. See cases cited in notes 9, 11, and 12 supra. In other cases in which the
Court could have commented on the substantive coverage of the Fair Housing Act, it has
chosen not to do so. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 271 (1977); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 513 n. 21 (1975). The Title
VIII cases decided by the Court thus far have all dealt with procedural issues. See Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205
(1972). See also Village of Bellwood v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1978),
cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 3068 (1978).
18 See 409 U.S. at 210-11.
19 For a brief discussion of housing discrimination in the United States, past and present,
see UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN: EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN HOUSING 1-13 (1973).
20 Id. at 124-130.

21 See cases cited in note 12 supra and text accompanying notes 370-415 supra. Other
legal theories used to challenge exclusionary zoning laws have included racial discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause (But see 429 U.S. 252. Cf. Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425
F.2d 1037 (10th Cir. 1970), cited in Arlington Heights, supra, 429 U.S. at 267-68 n.17);
discrimination against the poor under the Equal Protection Clause (see Note, Exclusionary
Zoning and Equal Protection, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1645, 1665 (1971). But see James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)); discrimination impinging on the right to secure housing (But see
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who work in the housing market should be apprised of just what the statute does
and does not require.
This article addresses the question of whether housing practices that produce
discriminatory effects violate the Fair Housing Act. The language and legislative
history of the statute are examined, the analogy to employment discrimination
law is explored, and the principal Title VIII cases are considered in an effort to
determine just what racial discrimination is under the Fair Housing Act.22 This
analysis leads to a suggested approach for evaluating Title VIII cases that are
based on discriminatory effect, including how such an effect may be shown by the
plaintiff and what significance such a showing should have in terms of the defendant's burden of justification.
I. The Fair Housing Act
A. Language and Structure
The starting point for determining what types of practices are proscribed
by the Fair Housing Act is the language of the statute itself. Nowhere does
Title VIII define discrimination in terms of either purpose or effect.22 The Act
begins by declaring that "[i]t is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States."2 The
next two sections deal with definitions (42 U.S.C. § 3602) and effective dates
and certain exemptions (42 U.S.C. § 3603). The substantive heart of the law
is in the various prohibitions contained in § 3604, § 3605 and § 3606.25 Indeed,
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972)); and discrimination impinging on the right
to travel (see Comment, The Right to Travel and Its Application to Restrictive Housing Laws,
66 Nw. U. L. REv. 635 (1971); Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional
Standard for Local Land Use Regulations? 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 612 (1972). But see Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
934 (1976)).
22 The focus of this article is racial discrimination, but it is worth noting that the Fair
Housing Act also prohibits discrimination on the basis of color, religion, sex, and national
origin (see 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605, and 3606 (1970)). The principles discussed in this
article presumably apply to these other forms of housing discrimination as well. Cf. Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 427 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 875 (1977) (Title VII cases in which the Griggs theory of
discriminatory effect was used in sex discrimination cases).
23 The same is true of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. But cf. the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1973 (1970)), which restricts the changes that an affected
unit of government can make in its voting practices to those approved by the Attorney General or those that do "not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridg3
ing the right to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 197 c (1970). See, e.g., City
of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975).
24 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1970).
25 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3605, and 3606 (1970). Another substantive section of Title
VIII is 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1970), which provides:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person
in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or
on account of his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or
enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606
of this title. This section may be enforced by appropriate civil action.
It is unclear whether a violation of § 3617 can be established without first establishing a
violation of §§ 3604, 3605, or 3606. Compare Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co., 408
F. Supp. 489, 497-98 (S.D. Ohio 1976) with Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v.
Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1288 n.5 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1025 (1978).
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the Fair Housing Act defines a discriminatory housing practice as any "act that
is unlawful under section 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.""6 Similarly, in its
enforcement provisions, Title VIII speaks in terms of "the rights granted" by
sections 3604, 3605, and 3606.27
The most important provision of these three substantive sections is §
3604(a), which makes it unlawful "[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making
of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise
make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin. 28 It is this subsection, and in particular the
"otherwise make unavailable or deny .

.

. because of race" phrase, that three

circuits have held prohibits housing practices with discriminatory effects.29
Some preliminary comments about the language of § 3604(a) are in order
here. First, the rather catchall nature of the "otherwise make unavailable or
deny" phrase and its location as the last prohibited practice in the subsection after
two provisions directed to more specific types of refusals to deal seem to reflect
an intention to include almost every housing practice imaginable, and indeed, a
number of courts have concluded that this language is "as broad as Congress
could have made it."'" Second, the crucial phrase "because of race" suggests a
concern for the defendant's reasons for his conduct, because "a party cannot
commit an act 'because of race' unless he intends to discriminate between
races."'" On the other hand, a similar phrase in Title VII--"because of such
individual's race"-has been interpreted by the Supreme Court not to require
proof of racial motive." Finally, it is interesting to note that § 3604(a), itself,
does not use the word "discriminate"; obviously discriminatory housing practices
are the object of § 3604(a)'s prohibitions, but it does not speak in terms of
discrimination explicitly.
The four other subsections of § 3604- and § 3605 and § 3606 each proscribe
different types of housing discrimination. ("Discrimination" or "discriminate"
are used in the titles of all three sections and in the body of §§ 3604(b), 3604(c),
3605, and 3606.) Section 3604(b) makes it unlawful to discriminate in the
terms, conditions, or privileges, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental of housing; § 3604(c) prohibits discriminatory
advertising or statements with respect to a housing transaction; § 3604(d)
proscribes misrepresentations concerning the availability of housing; § 3604(e)
outlaws "blockbusting"; § 3605 prohibits discrimination in the financing of
housing; and § 3606 bans discrimination with respect to membership or participation in multiple listing and other brokerage services.
One curious fact concerning the language used in these sections is that the
26
27

42 U.S.C. § 3602f (1970).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3612, 3613, 3615, and 3617 (1970).

28 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1970).
29 See cases cited in note 12 supra.
30 E.g., United States v. Youritan Construction Company, 370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D.
Cal. 1973), aff'd as modified, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975); Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp.
553, 557 (B.D. Mich. 1973).
31 558 F.2d at 1288.
32 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
33 See text accompanying note 26 supra.
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proscribed discrimination in § 3604(b) and (d) and § 3605 is put in terms of
the "because of race" phrase employed in § 3604 (a), while § 3604(c) is directed
toward discrimination "based on race," and § 3606 uses the words "on account
of race." 4 Perhaps little should be made of such minor differences," but they
do serve as a reminder that § 3605, § 3606, and the five subsections of § 3604
are separate provisions that prohibit different types of housing discrimination.
A particular housing practice is unlawful if it violates any one of these provisions,
although it is possible that some practices might violate more than one. 6 It is
not inconceivable, therefore, that a discriminatory effect standard might be appropriate for some of Title VIII's prohibitions, while discriminatory purpose
might be the applicable test for others.3 7
There is no question, of course, that purposeful discrimination violates Title
VIII. The most typical case under the Fair Housing Act involves a landlord's
refusal to rent an apartment to a minority homeseeker, who then alleges that the
reason for the refusal is racial discrimination.38 The focus of this type of case
is the landlord's motivation. The defendant usually responds by claiming that
he rejected the plaintiff for a legitimate, non-racial reason, such as his policy
against renting to people with pets or the fact that the apartment was given to a
better qualified tenant, and the courts have recognized that defendants "have a
right to refuse approval on any honest basis unrelated to the race" of the
prospective tenant. 9 On the other hand, if the plaintiff is successful in attacking
the credibility of these nonracial reasons (e.g., by showing that the building is
full of pet owners or that the new tenant is actually less qualified than he is), he is
likely to prevail, because he has established that the defendant intended to discriminate against him."
The fact that the typical Title VIII case has involved a claim of intentional
discrimination does not mean that housing practices with unintended discriminatory results may not also be illegal. The question is whether the Fair Housing
Act is limited to prohibiting purposeful discrimination only. In considering this
issue, it is important to distinguish between the two uses that may be made of
proof of discriminatory effect: discriminatory effect may be shown as evidence of
racial intent on the one hand or as a claimed substantive violation of Title VIII
on the other. Proving intentional discrimination in a fair housing case is diffi34 "On account of" is also used in § 3617. See note 25 supra.
35 See text accompanying notes 55 and 68 infra.
36 See, e.g., Zuch v. Hussey, 394 F. Supp. 1028, 1048-53 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd, 547
F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1976); United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., Inc., 484 F.2d 438 (5th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
37 It is also conceivable that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982
(1970)), which also bans housing discrimination (see Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968)), might employ a standard different from Title VIII's. A recent Supreme Court
decision states that Griggs discriminatory effect holding involved only § 2000e-2(a) (2) and
that whether effect alone also violates other parts of Title VII, such as § 2003-2(a) (1), has
not yet been decided. Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 98 S. Ct. 347 (1977).
38 See, e.g., Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Company, 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir. 1970);
Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
39 Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055, 1056 (7th Cir.
1972).
40 See, e.g., cases cited in note 38 supra. See also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
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cult.4' One of the ways it can be done is to show that the defendant's practices
have had the effect of discriminating against minorities,4 2 although this type of
proof generally might be available only in cases involving a large apartment
complex or housing development. There is no question that proof of discriminatory effect is at least relevant in a housing discrimination case in which
the issue is whether the defendant's actions were racially motivated. It is a different matter, however, to say that housing practices with discriminatory effects
are themselves unlawful regardless of whether they were racially motivated.
Here, the defendant by hypothesis is innocent of any illicit motivation, and the
question is whether his conduct is nevertheless unlawful under Title VIII.
The distinction is, of course, much less clear in practice than in theory. In
actual litigation, the plaintiff may produce proof of discriminatory effect in the
hope that the trier of fact will be persuaded that this proof establishes purposeful discrimination, or, failing this, that the court will hold that the effect alone is
sufficient to establish a violation. Thus, a fair housing plaintiff is always well
advised to produce proof of intentional discrimination if he can. But the distinction between discriminatory effect as proof of racial purpose and a per se
violation is important to keep in mind in order to focus on whether Title VIII
is limited to intentionally discriminatory practices.
Most of the other sections of the Fair Housing Act have to do with its
administration and enforcement. Some of these sections contain language that
may be taken as clues as to whether Title VIII is properly directed toward discriminatory purpose or discriminatory effect. For example, § 3608, which places
certain administrative responsibilities in the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, provides that the Secretary "shall administer the programs and
activities relating to housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to
further the policies of this subchapter."4 Thus, the federal government is re41 Bogen & Falcon, The Use of Racial Statistics in Fair Housing Cases, 34 MD. L. RV.
59, 61-65 (1974).
A common technique used to prove discrimination in fair housing cases is to have a white
"tester" apply to the defendant in the same manner as a rejected minority applicant in order
to determine whether the defendant treats white homeseekers differently than similarly situated
black homeseekers. The courts have regularly endorsed this method of proving housing discrimination. See, e.g., Smith v. Anchor Bldg. Corp., 536 F.2d 231, 234 n.2 (8th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Youritan Construction Company, 370 F. Supp. 643, 647 n.3 and 650 [and
cases cited] (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd as modified, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975); Williamson v.
Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (N.D. Ill.1972). Some courts have
even held that the testers themselves have a cause of action if they are subjected to racial
discrimination. E.g., Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559 F.2d 894,
897-98 (3rd Cir. 1977); Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition v. Jenna Resales Co., 429
F. Supp. 486, 488 (E.D. N.Y. 1977). See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Evers v.
Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958).
42 Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring): "Frequently the niost probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually
happened rither than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For
normally the actor is presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds."
43 See, e.g., Resident Advisory Board v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
98 S. Ct. 1457 (1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, Missouri, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
44 42 U.S.C. § 3608(d) (5) (1970). Section 3608(c) contains an almost identical charge
to all federal executive departments and agencies to affirmatively administer their housing
programs "to further the purposes of this subchapter."
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quired not merely to avoid discriminatory housing practices, but to promote fair
housing affirmatively, and this special requirement means that it cannot adopt
a neutral, "color blind" position if this would have the effect of maintaining or
perpetuating segregated housing.45 It might be argued that since this affirmative
language does not appear in § 3604, § 3605, or § 3606, these provisions should
be interpreted to permit racially neutral housing practices. But even if this were
true, the question remains whether a practice adopted for non-racial reasons that
has the effect of discriminating against blacks is "racially neutral." The affirmative requirement to advance fair housing contained in § 3608 goes well beyond
the requirement to avoid practices with discriminatory effects," so that the
absence of the word "affirmatively" in the substantive sections of Title VIII does
not necessarily mean that they are limited to racially motivated practices.
The Fair Housing Act provides for three separate, alternative enforcement
mechanisms: an administrative complaint to the Secretary of HUD under §
3610 ;47 a direct court action without a prior administrative complaint pursuant
to § 3612; and "pattern or practice" and "general public importance" cases
brought by the Attorney General as authorized by § 3613.48 Each of these three
sections spells out the particular relief that is available under it, with only the
direct action section explicitly providing for monetary as well as injunctive
relief.49 The specific authorization in § 3612(c) for a limited punitive damage
award in an appropriate case, over and above equitable relief and actual damages,
might suggest that illicit motive is not a necessary element in proving a Title
VIII violation in a private suit, but that a showing of intentional discrimination
might be relevant only in terms of justifying punitive damages. Again, however,
this argument, though plausible, does not require that Title VIII extend beyond
discriminatory purpose cases, because proof of discriminatory purpose may not
be the same as the showing required for an award of punitive damages under
§ 3612(c)." °
45 See, e.g., Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 820 (3rd Cir. 1970).
46 See id. at 816. See also Schwemm, supra note 2, at 996.
47 If HUD's efforts to obtain voluntary compliance fail, the complainant may then pursue
the matter in a private suit in federal court, which is authorized to enjoin the respondent or
take other appropriate action. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(d) (1970). On the other hand, a victim of
housing discrimination may sue directly pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970) without exhausting his administrative remedies. See, e.g., Young v. AAA Realty Company of Greensboro, Inc.,
350 F. Supp. 1382, 1384-85 (M.D. N.C. 1972); Crim v. Glover, 338 F. Supp. 823, 825 (S.D.
Ohio 1972) ; Johnson v. Decker, 333 F. Supp. 88, 90-92 (N.D. Cal. 1971) ; Brown v. Lo Duca,
307 F. Supp. 102, 103 (E.D. Wis. 1969). See also Note, Discrimination in Employment and in
Housing: Private Enforcement Provisions of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1968, 82 HARV.
L. REv. 834, 839, 856-57, 862 (1969).
48 For an examination of the Attorney General's authority to bring "pattern or practice"
suits pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970) and the relation of this authority to the proper
interpretation of the substantive provisions of Title VIII, see text accompanying notes 202-221
infra.
49 See 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970). Damages may not be available in an action brought
pursuant to § 3610(d) that grows out of an administrative complaint to HUD. See Brown v.
Ballas, 331 F. Supp. 1033 (N.D. Tex. 1971); Note, supra note 47, at 839, 861.
50 Some have argued that proof of purposeful discrimination is sufficient to justify an
award of punitive damages (e.g., Adickes v. Kress and Company, 398 U.S. 144, 232-34
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)), but most courts in fair
housing cases have required an additional degree of wilfulness to support a punitive damage
award. See, e.g., Crumble v. Blumthal, 549 F.2d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 1977); Marr v. Rife, 503
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Thus, the language of the Fair Housing Act is ultimately inconclusive on
the matter of whether practices with unintended discriminatory effects are prohibited. The "purposes" and "policies" of the Act are referred to,"1 but are not
spelled out. The "rights granted" by Title VIII and the "discriminatory housing
practices" proscribed by it are defined only by reference to the various substantive provisions of § 3604, § 3605, and § 3606. These sections ban refusals to
based on race," and
deal and other housing discrimination "because of race, ....
"on account of race," and these phrases, in turn, may be interpreted in different
ways.52 Thus, the meaning of housing discrimination under Title VIII is susceptible to varying interpretations, and perhaps this should not be particularly
surprising. 3 Under such circumstances, it becomes necessary to examine the
legislative history of the Act to understand the congressional concerns that
prompted its passage and to determine "the precise meaning of the statute before
us."

54

B. Legislative History
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 represents the culmination of
three years of congressional consideration of housing discrimination legislation.
Its legislative history is protracted and chaotic, spanning such nationally traumatic
events as the urban riots of 1967 and the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther
55
King.
Fair housing legislation was first before the Congress in 1966 as a result of
a proposal made by President Johnson. The administration bills, S. 3296 and
H.R. 14765, differed in a number of respects from what was to become Title
VIII,"0 but they did include the "because of race" language in their substantive
sections. No explanation or definition of this phrase was given in terms of the
purpose-or-effect issue, but the language was similar to that used in Title VII
F.2d 735, 744-45 (6th Cir. 1974).
51 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 and 3608(c) and (d)(5) (1970).
52 See text accompanying notes 31 and 32 supra.
53 "The concept of 'discrimination,' like the phrase 'equal protection of the laws,' is
word is not a
susceptible to varying interpretations, for as Mr. Justice Holmes declared, '[a]
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in
color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.' Towne v.
Eisner, 245 U.S. 418 (1918)." Regents of University of 'California v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733,
2745 (1978). See also id. at 2773 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that in drafting Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, "Congress specifically
eschewed any static definition of discrimination in favor of broad language that could be
shaped by experience, administrative necessity, and evolving judicial doctrine").
54 See 98 S.Ct. at 2745.
55 See Note, supra note 47, at 835, 858, 863; Comment, The Federal Fair Housing
Requirements: Title VIII of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, 1969 DUKE L. J. 733, 734 n.8, 750
n.86 and n.87. For descriptions of the legislative history of Title VIII, see generally Dubofsky,
Fair Housing: A Legislative History and a Perspective, 8 WASHBURN L. J. 149 (1969); Historical Overview-Equal Opportunity in Housing, [1973] EQ. Opp. HSING. RPTR. (P-H)
2301 at 2312-14.
56 The principal difference was that the original proposals did not provide for an administrative remedy as an alternative to a direct action in court, as Title VIII now does (see 42
U.S.C. § 3610 (1970) and note 47, supra). See EQ. Opp. HSING. RPTR., supra note 55, at
2312-13.
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of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and may well have been derived from that law.
The Judiciary Committees of both the Senate and the House of Representatives held lengthy hearings on the fair housing proposals. The House committee
reported an amended bill, which the full House passed, but in the Senate, where
the Judiciary Committee had failed to report a bill, a successful filibuster prevented any floor action on the matter."
Again in 1967, the Administration proposed civil rights legislation that contained provisions relating to housing discrimination. 8 This time, the House
Judiciary Committee did not act favorably on the administration bill, but rather
reported another bill (H.R. 2516) that was limited to protecting civil rights
workers by establishing penalties for certain acts of violence or intimidation
directed against them. This bill, which did not include a fair housing title, was
passed by the House and referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
The Senate Committee reported an amended version of H.R. 2516, but the full
Senate did not consider it in 1967.
When H.R. 2516 came to the floor of the Senate in early 1968, Senators
Mondale and Brooke sponsored a fair housing amendment to the bill."5 This
proposal was subsequently withdrawn in favor of a compromise fair housing
amendment offered by Senator Dirksen.60 Even the Dirksen amendment, however, failed initially to command enough votes to end the filibuster that threatened to kill it.61 Then, on March 1, 1968, came the release of the Report of
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (the "Kerner Commission
Report"), with its dramatic conclusion that "America is dividing into two
societies, black and white, separate and unequal.... ,,s The report included the
Commission's recommendation that a comprehensive federal open housing law
should be enacted. 3 The Senate voted cloture on March 4.4 The Dirksen
proposal was then debated and agreed to with only minor amendments,6 5 and
the Senate passed its amended version of H.R. 2516 by a vote of 71-20 on March
11, 1968.6
The bill was then returned to the House, where it was referred to the Rules
Committee for consideration of the Senate version. On April 4, Dr. King was
assassinated, and Washington was shaken by a new round of civil disorders.
Within days, the Rules Committee had concluded its hearings and reported the
57 See EQ. Opp. HSING. RPTR., supra note 55, at 2313; 112 CONG. REc. INDEX 1183
(1966).
58 See H.R. 5700 and S. 1026, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
59 See Dubofsky, supra note 55, at 152 n.12. Hearings on what became the MondaleBrooke amendment had been held by the Housing and Urban Affairs Subcommittee of the
Senate Banking and Currency Committee in August, 1967 (id. at 149-50 n.3), but no bill had
been reported as a result of these hearings.
60 Id. at 155-58.
61 Id. at 158.
62 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 225 (1968). For
a description of the role played by the Kerner Commission Report in the legislative history of

Title VIII, see Laufman v. Oakley Building & Loan Co., 408 F. Supp. 489, 496-97 (S.D. Ohio
1976) and Dubofsky, supra note 55, at 158.
63 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 481 (1968).
64 See Dubofsky, supra note 55, at 158-59.
65 Id. at 159.
66 114 CONG. REc. 5992 (1968).
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bill, and on April 10, the House voted 250-171 to accept the Senate's amendments, including the fair housing title." The next day, President Johnson signed
into law the Civil Rights Act of 1968.
This history shows that even though fair housing legislation had been before
the Congress for a number of years, Title VIII, itself, resulted from a relatively
short, albeit intense, period of congressional consideration that took place against
the background of dramatic national events. The rather chaotic circumstances
under which the law was passed led one early commentator to suggest that in
interpreting the enforcement provisions of the Fair Housing Act, "it may simply
be necessary to recognize that the title was less the result of careful planning
than of calculated compromise.""8 In addition, since the statute was enacted
substantially unchanged from the way it was first introduced by Senator Dirksen
on the floor of the Senate, its legislative history does not include the committee
reports and other documents that usually accompany major legislation.6" Most
of the relevant statements concerning its intent and coverage were made in the
floor debates on the bill, particularly those in the Senate. Lower courts have
remarked on the "somewhat sketchy" nature of this legislative history, and in
Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.," the first Title VIII case to
reach the Supreme Court, the Court noted that "[t]he legislative history of the
Act is not too helpful." 72
Certainly there is nothing in the legislative history of Title VIII that clearly
resolves the question of whether its coverage was to extend to cases of discriminatory effect. The matter was not discussed in Congress, and with the Supreme
Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co." still three years away, the lack
of interest in the purpose-or-effect issue generally and in the context of housing
discrimination in particular was hardly surprising. Intentional discrimination was
a way of life in the real estate business, and it was to this situation that the proponents of the Fair Housing Act primarily addressed themselves. Nevertheless,
certain points made in the Senate and House debates on Title VIII are relevant
to the problem of whether the law covers practices with discriminatory effects,
and they do suggest a broader congressional concern than simply banning purposeful discrimination.
For example, the legislative history demonstrates that Congress was aware
of the problems of proof inherent in establishing racial intent in a Title VIII
case. During the Senate debates, Senator Baker introduced an amendment which
would have exempted from coverage any homeowner who engaged a real estate
agent "without indicating any preference, limitation or discrimination based on
race. . ., or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.1 74 A number of the bilFs proponents, including Senator Mondale, objected
67 114 CONG. REC. 9620-21 (1968).
68 Note, supra note 47, at 858. See also id. at 835, 863.
69 See 564 F.2d at 147 n.29. But see supra note 59.
70 See, e.g., 564 F.2d at 147.
71 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
72 Id. at 210.
73 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
74 114 CONG. REC. 5214 (1968). Senator Baker's amendment would have broadened the
exemption contained in § 3603 that permits an individual homeowner to discriminate in the sale
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that the Baker amendment would make proof of discrimination difficult in all
but the most blatant cases."5 Senator Dominick suggested that the amendment
"increases the opportunity for discrimination," 7 and Senator Percy stated, "If
I understand this amendment, it would require proof that the single homeowner
had specified racial preference. I maintain that proof would be impossible to
produce." 77 The Baker amendment was rejected by the Senate."'
Another point repeatedly made in the Senate and House debates was the
proponents' desire that Title VIII would result not only in greater housing choice
for individual blacks, but also in racial integration generally for the benefit of all
Americans. A number of examples are cited in the Supreme Court's opinion in
Trafficante, including Senator Mondale's classic statement that the purpose of
the law he proposed was to replace the ghettos "by truly integrated and balanced
living patterns."7 On the House side, Congressman Celler, the Chairman of
the Judiciary Committee, spoke of the need to eliminate the "blight of segregated
housing and the pale of the ghetto,""0 and Congressman Ryan saw Title VIII as
a way to help "achieve the aim of an integrated society."'" Aware of the conclusion of the Kerner Commission that America was dividing into two racially
separate societies, Congress clearly intended Title VIII to remedy segregated
housing patterns and the problems that these patterns caused-segregated
schools, unavailability of suburban employment opportunities to minorities, and
alienation of whites and blacks due to the "lack of experience in actually living
next" to each other.8 2 Furthermore, the proponents of the new law, according
to Trafficante, felt that the victims of discriminatory housing practices and thus
the beneficiaries of Title VIII were not only blacks and other minority groups,
but "as Senator Javits said in supporting the bill, 'the whole community.' "83
This part of the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act indicates that
Congress sought to achieve the result of an integrated society through this legislation, which was "seen as an attempt to alter the entire character of the housing
market."8 4 But it is possible to agree that the goals of Title VIII are to promote
"open, integrated residential housing patterns and to prevent the increase of
segregation, in ghettos, of racial groups whose lack of opportunities the Act was
designed to combat" ' and still conclude that Congress thought it could achieve
these goals by eliminating only purposeful discrimination. This possibility is
somewhat undercut, however, by two remarks made by Senator Mondale. Comof his personal residence if the sale is conducted without the aid of a real estate agent. See 42
U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1970).
75 114 CONG. REc. 5218 (1968).
76 Id. at 5220.
77 Id. at 5216.
78 Id. at 5221-22.
79 Id. at 3422, cited in Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211
(1972). See also id. at 210 and n.10.
80 114 CONG. REc. 9559 (1968).
81 Id. at 9591.
82 Id. at 2274-76 (remarks of Senator Mondale).
83 409 U.S. at 211 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 2706 (1968)).
84 Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630, 652 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (Wilkey, J., concurring).
85 Otero v. New York City Housing Authority, 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2nd Cir. 1973).
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menting on the role that federal, state, and local governments had played in
maintaining segregated housing conditions, he concluded that "[i]t thus seems
only fair, and is constitutional, that Congress should pass a fair housing act to
undo the effects of these past State and Federal unconstitutionally discriminatory
actions.""6 This desire to undo the effects of past discrimination is explicitly
provided for in Title VIII with respect to the federal government by the affirmative requirements of § 3608(c) and (d) (5), as noted above, but Senator
Mondale's comments were directed to local governments as well. Elsewhere he
noted:
Negroes who live in slum ghettoes, however, have been unable to move to
suburban communities and other exclusively White areas. In part, this inability stems from a refusal by suburbs and other communities to accept lowincome housing. . . . An important factor contributing to exclusion of
Negroes from such areas, moreover,8 7has been the policies and practices of
agencies of government at all levels.
Thus, the principal sponsor of Title VIII apparently believed that its substantive provisions, apart from § 3608, prohibited governmental practices that
maintained the effects of past discrimination, and interestingly enough, the three
circuits that have held that discriminatory effect should be the standard under
the Fair Housing Act have done so in cases against municipal defendants.88 In
enjoining Philadelphia's interference with the construction of a subsidized housing development in Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 9 for example, the Third
Circuit cited statements from Senators Mondale and Brooke to support its conclusion that Congress was concerned in Title VIII with "eliminating the
adverse discriminatory effects of past and present prejudice in housing."8 "
Even if the value of this legislative history were conceded, however, two
problems remain. First, the discriminatory effects that Senator Mondale indicated Title VIII would undo were those that had resulted from past discriminatory iction, and a case could be made that housing practices with discriminatory effects are condemned by Title VIII only if they can be traced to some
intentional discrimination in the past."
Second, the specific problem to which congressional attention was being
directed by Senator Mondale was governmental discrimination, and conceivably,
he and the other proponents of Title VIII intended the law to be more strictly
applied to the actions of public defendants than to those of private defendants.
Housing discrimination by government officials and agencies might be considered

86 114 CONG. REc. 2698-2703 (1968).
87 114 CONG. RaG. 2277 (1968).
88 See cases cited in note 12, supra. See also Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of
Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108 (2nd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); 465 F.2d 630.
89 564 F.2d 126.
90 Id. at 147 and n.30 (citing 114 CONG. REC. 228 (1968))
(remarks of Senator
Brooke) and 114 CONG. REc. 3421 (1968) (remarks of Senator Mondale).
91 See generally Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term-Foreword: In Defense of the
Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1976).
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more harmful than private discrimination," and to the extent that the constitutional authority for Title VIII was thought to lie in the enforcement power of
the fourteenth amendment,9 3 it is possible that Congress was empowered, and
did intend, to go farther in outlawing discriminatory housing practices when
state, rather than private, action is involved. But there is little in the legislative
history to support this interpretation. Most of the hearings and debates on Title
VIII related to private housing discrimination, and the substantive provisions of
the law do not distinguish between public and private defendants. Furthermore,
the one time that Congress explicitly considered an intent requirement was when
the Senate rejected the Baker amendment, which related exclusively to private
discrimination. Thus, even though the congressional power to prohibit discrimination is arguably greater when governmental housing practices are involved, the legislative history of Title VIII does not reveal an intent to enact a
stricter standard of liability for public defendants than private defendants, apart
from the affirmative requirements placed on the federal government by § 3608.
In summary, the legislative history of the Fair Housing Act does not conclusively establish whether the law was intended to prohibit practices with unintended discriminatory effects. Certainly, this interpretation is not inconsistent
with that history, which reveals a Congress concerned with the proof problems
of an intent standard and with eliminating practices that adversely affect blacks,
at least to the extent that these effects can be traced to prior intentional discrimination. No Congressman ever directly stated whether he thought denying
housing or making it otherwise unavailable "because of race" limited the Act's
coverage to purposeful discrimination or whether it might include practices with
discriminatory effects as well. The "because of race" phrase is similar to the
language used in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and it is the Supreme
Court's interpretation of this law to prohibit employment practices with discriminatory effects that has been the most persuasive source in the debate over
the meaning of the Fair Housing Act. Whether the analogy of these employment
cases is apt enough to justify applying the Title VII-Griggs standards to Title
VIII cases is now examined.
II. The Analogy to Title VII
A. Intentional Discrimination under Title VII
Overt and intentional racial discrimination in employment is the most
92 Governmental power and influence over the housing market may be more widespread
than that of private firms, and governmental discrimination may be less defensible. But see
558 F.2d at 1293. In addition, official discrimination may impose a degree of stigmatic injury
on blacks that is absent or at least less apparent in instances of private discrimination. See
generally Brest, supra note 91, at 9-11, 34.
93 See note 218 infra. However, Title VIII is now generally recognized to have been
enacted pursuant to the congressional enforcement power under the thirteenth amendment as
well as under the fourteenth amendment. See note 230 infra. This question of the power of
Congress to enact Title VIII, however, is different from the question of what Congress intended
the law to cover.
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obvious type of violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 94 just as
purposeful housing discrimination is unquestionably banned by Title VIII.
Examples of blatant racial discrimination, however, are rarely seen in employment cases. Rather, Title VII suits generally deal with more subtle forms of discrimination, which may be either purposeful or unintended. For example, a
rejected applicant may allege intentional discrimination on the part of an employer, even though the company claims to have acted on the basis of neutral,
legitimate considerations, such as the plaintiff's past misconduct.95 As in the
typical fair housing case, the issue in such a "disparate treatment" suit is the
defendant's motive, and the plaintiff has the burden of proof on this issue.9 6
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. u. Green," the Supreme Court held that a
private, non-class action plaintiff could establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII by showing (1) that he belongs to a racial minority;
(2) that he applied and was qualified for a job that the employer was seeking to
fill; (3) that he was rejected despite being qualified for the job; and (4) that
after his rejection, the employer continued to seek applicants or hired a white
person for the job.9" Once this showing has been made, the burden shifts to the
employer to articulate some legitimate, nonracial reason for the employee's
rejection.9 9 In a disparate treatment case under Title VII, the company will
prevail if the court believes that it acted for legitimate purposes. When the issue
is motive, no violation exists so long as the real reason for the company's action
is truly nonracial, even though that reason may be subjective or frivolous.' 0
On the other hand, the plaintiff is entitled to win if he successfully rebuts the
company's claim by establishing that the reason given is only a pretext for racial
discrimination. He may try to do this by showing that similarly situated white
employees were hired or that the defendant's overall hiring patterns reflect disThus, proof of discriminatory effect may be used in a
criminatory results.'
disparate treatment case as evidence of racial motive, and there is no reason why
this should not also be true in a Title VIII case. The more difficult question is
whether the discriminatory effects themselves may be held unlawful without
94 See, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15
(1977).
95 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Title VII claims based upon "disparate impact" should be distinguished from
96
claims of "disparate treatment." . . . In a disparate treatment case plaintiff alleges
and must prove purposeful discrimination in defendant employer's hiring practices,
although sometimes discriminatory motive can be inferred from facts showing inequality in treatment. On the other hand, a disparate impact claim alleges only the
discriminatory effect of facially neutral employment practices, and plaintiff need not
prove that defendant intended to discriminate. International Bhd. Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate
Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L. Rav. 1, 2 n.3 (1977). See also Furnco Const.
Corp. v. Waters, 98 S. Ct. 2943 (1978).
97 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
98 Id. at 802.
99 Id.
100 See id. at 803. See also Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the Federal Regulation of Employment Discrimination, 1977 ILL. L. FoRUM 69, 72 (1977).
101 See 411 U.S. at 804-05.
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proof of intentional discrimination, a question the Supreme Court answered
affirmatively for purposes of Title VII in Griggs v. Duke Power CO."°2
B. Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
In Griggs, the Supreme Court unanimously held that employment practices
that "operate to disqualify Negroes at a substantially higher rate than white applicants"'0 3 violate Title VII unless the defendant proves that they are "significantly related to successful job performance."' 4 The practice at issue in Griggs
was Duke Power's use of a standardized intelligence test and a high school education requirement to screen applicants for certain of its higher paying jobs.
Thirteen black workers brought a class action on behalf of themselves and all
other black employees and potential employees, seeking to have these requirements enjoined because they operated in a racially exclusionary fashion with
0 5
respect to jobs above the menial laborer category.
The evidence showed that a battery of standardized tests, including those
used by Duke Power, resulted in pass rates of 58% for whites as compared with
only 6% for blacks and that 34% of the white males in the state had completed
high school, while the comparable figure for black males was only 12%. 106
There was no showing, however, of a discriminatory purpose in the adoption or
administration of the diploma and test requirements, and the courts below ruled
against the plaintiffs, concluding that a subjective test of the employer's intent
should govern Title VII claims." 7 The Supreme Court reversed. Chief Justice
Burger's opinion held that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practice, not simply the motivation." 0 The plaintiffs'
showing of disparate impact shifted the burden to the employer to show that the
challenged practice "bear[s] a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it was used."' ' The Court held that the defendant failed to meet this burden of establishing job relatedness primarily
because the record showed that white employees who had not completed high
school or passed the required tests prior to the institution of these requirements
nevertheless had performed satisfactorily in the upper-level jobs."0
The plaintiffs' claim in Griggs was based on § 703 (a) of Title VII, which
makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any individual
"because of such individual's race.""' The Supreme Court's opinion did not spe102

401 U.S. 424.

103 Id. at 426.
104 Id.
105 See id. at 429 n.5; Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1227-28 (4th Cir. 1970),
rev'd, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The plaintiffs did not claim damages or any other relief beyond
an injunction against the defendant's use of the testing and diploma requirements. Id. at 1236
n.9.
106 401 U.S. at 430 n.6.
107 Id. at 428-29.
108 Id. at 432.
109 Id. at 431.
110 Id. at 431-32. See also id., at 427-28.
111 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
The defendant contended that neither of its screening devices violated § 703 (a) and that
its use of general intelligence tests was specifically authorized by § 703 (h) (42 U.S.C. §
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cifically discuss the meaning of this phrase, but it did observe that "[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of
the statute."' "1 2 That objective, the Court held, was "to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past" to
hurt minority employees."' Certainly, similar objectives could be said to underlie
the Fair Housing Act. And the congressional concern with the consequences and
operational results of a defendant's practices, rather than with merely his intent,
that was stressed throughout the Griggs opinion".4 is also evident in the legislative
history of Title VIII."'
Griggs held that Title VII's prohibition of practices that deprive an individual of employment opportunities because of his race "proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory
in operation.""' 6 Rather than examining the "because of such individual's
race" language of § 703(a), the Supreme Court focused instead on the broad
purposes underlying Title VII. If it felt that the wording of § 703 (a) provided
any obstacle to its ultimate holding that discriminatory intent was not required
for a Title VII violation, no mention was ever made of it. As a matter of statutory construction, then, this approach is a strong precedent for holding that
the "because of race" language used in the Fair Housing Act is also consistent
with a discriminatory effect standard."'
Just as the Griggs opinion did not focus on the specific operational language
of § 703 (a), neither did the two-stage analysis that it developed for evaluating a
Title VII claim spring from the terms used in the statute. Title VII mentions
neither "discriminatory effect" nor "business necessity," but after Griggs, the keys
to these cases have become whether the plaintiff can show that a challenged
employment practice operates to discriminate against blacks and, if so, whether
the employer can then prove that the practice is job related."' The Court's
opinion nowhere indicates the source of this approach. Apparently, its principal
claim is that it simply makes sense. If a practice or test hurts blacks and does not
2000e-2(h) (1970)), which provides that a company may rely on professionally developed
ability tests provided they are not used to discriminate "because of race." The Supreme Court
did not pass on the meaning of the "because of race" phrase in this section, because it held
that "professionally developed ability tests" only included those tests that were job related. This
defense failed in Griggs, because Duke Power had not established that its tests were job
related. In addition, the § 703(h) defense had no applicability to the high school diploma
requirement (see 401 U.S. at 433 n.8), which Griggs also held violated the § 703 (a) prohibition against discrimination "because of such individual's race."
112 401 U.S. at 429. Nor did the Griggs opinion discuss the legislative history of § 703(a).
The only legislative history considered by the Court had to do with the extent of Title VII's
limited authorization of professionally developed ability tests. See 401 U.S. at 434-36. See
also note 111 supra.
113 401 U.S. at 429-30.
114 E.g., id. at 431.
115 See text accompanying notes 55-93 supra.
116 401 U.S. at 431.
117 The precedent would be stronger, of course, if Griggs had been decided before, instead
of after, the passage of Title VIII. Then, the argument could have been made that Congress
was aware that its use of the "because of race" phrase would be judicially interpreted to include an effect standard and that it therefore specifically intended to endorse such a standard
for the Fair Housing Act (compare note 221 infra).
118 See generally Lopatka, supra note 100, at 74-89.
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serve any legitimate employment purpose for the company, it should be enjoined.
Not so obvious perhaps is why the burden of proof with respect to the issue of
job relatedness should be placed on the employer, although this, too, is sensible.
Presumably the company knows why it instituted the particular practice under
review, and it is easier for the company to show what these business reasons are
than for plaintiff to "prove a negative" (i.e., that there is no legitimate justification for the practice)."' Since this two-step analysis of Griggs is a creature of
judicial interpretation rather than of the specific language of Title VII, there is
no reason in terms of statutory construction why it could not be applied equally
well to fair housing cases.
The Griggs opinion also indicated an awareness by the Supreme Court that
subtle forms of discrimination might continue if a purpose test were adopted for
Title VII. In rejecting Duke Power's claim that it was covered by a specific
exemption in Title VII authorizing the use of professionally developed, nondiscriminatory tests,1"' the Chief Justice noted that Congress had objected to a
broader version of this exemption that would have permitted any test, "whether
it was a good test or not, so long as it was professionally designed. Discrimination
could actually exist under the guise of compliance with the statute. '" 2' As the
Court must have realized, one of the results of the discriminatory effect standard
adopted in Griggs is that a defendant who is intentionally discriminating is less
likely to escape liability than he would be under a purpose test."' Objective
effects are simply easier to observe and prove than subjective intent is.
The difficulty of proof under a purpose standard, however, was not explicitly
relied on by the Court as a rationale for holding that employment practices with
unjustified discriminatory effects violate Title VII. Here again, it is helpful to
distinguish between deciding that such effects are substantively unlawful on the
one hand and merely using those effects as evidence that a defendant is intentionally discriminating "under the guise of compliance with the statute" on the
other. The reference in the Griggs opinion to the concern of the proponents of
Title VII that it prohibit disguised as well as blatant discrimination is interesting
because similar congressional concerns can be cited in the legislative history of the
Fair Housing Act.' 23 But it is important to remember that the defendant in
Griggs had been found to have adopted its diploma and test requirements without any intent to discriminate, and this finding was accepted by the Supreme
Court. "' The racial effects produced by these screening requirements were not
offered as proof of a hidden motive; they were themselves unlawful.
Is this decision fair to the company? Surely it is not an obvious proposition
that an employer whose job requirements are adopted solely for legitimate business reasons should be held to have violated a federal statute merely on the basis
119

See Comment, Applying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VIII Litigation, 11

HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128, 157-58 (1976).

120 See note 111, supra.
121 401 U.S. at 435 (quoting remarks of Senator Case).
122 See Schwemm, supra note 2, at 999 n.224.
123 See text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.
124 See 401 U.S. at 428, 432.
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of the unintended effects of these requirements. The first response to this concern
is that it was up to Congress to decide what fairness required in Title VII and
that its determination to attack the consequences of the problem of employment
discrimination rather than the motives that originally created it seems appropriate and is certainly not unprecedented. A company is simply made responsible
for knowing the law and for making sure its practices conform to it, as is the case
with antitrust laws, safety laws, and countless others.
There were other factors in Griggs, however, that made its interpretation of
Title VII seem eminently fair. Specifically, these included: (1) the fact that the
defendant had engaged in intentional discrimination in the past; (2) the fact
that the plaintiffs' ability to pass the company's tests was impaired by a history of
inferior and segregated education; (3) the fact that the screening devices were
not shown to be related to successful job performance; and (4) the limited
nature of the relief sought by the plaintiffs. The operational jobs that plaintiffs
sought had been closed to blacks by Duke Power until the effective date of Title
VII, when the company instituted its testing requirement.'2 5 These tests, in turn,
maintained the effects of this past intentional discrimination, because blacks generally failed them at a substantially higher rate than whites, a fact that the
Supreme Court felt was "directly traceable" to the inferior, segregated education
that blacks in the area had received.' 26 This combination of the company's
past discrimination and its use of screening devices that disproportionately excluded blacks as a result of prior state-imposed segregation certainly influenced
the Court's decision. As the Chief Justice wrote: "Under the Act, practices,
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent,
cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.""'
In addition to the fact that blacks were being frozen out of the higher paying
jobs at Duke Power, the company's interest in maintaining its diploma and
testing requirements seemed marginal. Both requirements were adopted without
meaningful study concerning their relation to job performance, neither measured
the ability to learn to perform the particular jobs for which they were used, and
white employees who had previously been hired without meeting them had
performed satisfactorily. 2 Under these circumstances, the limited relief sought
by the plaintiffs-an injunction prohibiting the use of these screening devicesseemed little more than a request that the company stop spending money on a
practice that did it little or no good and that substantially injured blacks.
Thus, the equities in Griggs did strongly favor the plaintiffs, and it is dif125 Id. at 426-28.
126 Id. at 430. There was no showing in Griggs that the individual plaintiffs themselves
had actually received inferior educations as a result of having attended segregated schools.
Furthermore, the statistics relied on by the Supreme Court to support its conclusion that the
testing and diploma requirements had a disproportionate impact on blacks were statewide and
national figures that were not shown to have reflected local pass-fail rates. See id. at 430 n.6.
Thus, in tracing the plaintiffs' poor performance on Duke Power's tests to past discrimination
against blacks generally, the Court showed its willingness to view Title VII plaintiffs not merely as injured individuals, but as members of a larger class made up of an entire racial group.
127 401 U.S. at 430.
128 401 U.S. at 427-32.
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ficult to imagine that the Supreme Court would not rule the same way in a Fair
Housing Act case that involved a similar record. The operative languages of Title
VII and Title VIII are similar, and the latter's legislative history includes
evidence of a congressional intent to outlaw practices that would perpetuate the
effects of past housing discrimination. If a fair housing defendant were shown
to have intentionally discriminated before 1968 and then adopted practices that
were "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation," those practices should be
enjoined under Title VIII, absent a showing that they are required by something
akin to "business necessity" as that defense is spelled out in Griggs. But this is the
easy (and the extremely rare) case. What if there is no history of purposeful
discrimination? What if the discriminatory effect of the screening requirements is
not traceable to prior state-imposed segregation or is not as substantial as it was
in Griggs? How vital must the defendant's interest in its practices be in order to
sustain his burden under the "business necessity" test? And would the legal
standard be different in a case where money damages or an affirmative order are
sought in addition to injunctive relief?
C. DiscriminatoryEffect After Griggs
Some of these questions left open by Griggs have been answered by the
Supreme Court in subsequent Title VII cases, and the others have been addressed
by the various courts of appeals. First of all, the lower courts consistently applied
Griggs to any practice with discriminatory effects, even in the absence of prior
intentional discrimination by the defendant,129 and the Supreme Court recently
agreed. 3 Similarly, the suggestion in Griggs that its holding might be limited to
banning only those practices whose discriminatory effect on blacks was directly
traceable to their inferior segregated educations has not materialized. The lower
courts have generally not relied on this factor, and the Supreme Court, though
referring to it on occasion,""1 has more often ignored it."' With respect to relief,
the Court has gone beyond the injunction issued in Griggs to hold that an award
of back pay in a Title VII case should not be conditioned on a showing of discriminatory intent."' The courts of appeals have also approved of preferential
remedies (e.g., quotas, fictional seniority) regardless of whether the underlying
violation was intentional or not,"' although the Supreme Court has yet to decide

129 See Lopatka, supra note 100, at 73.
130 See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 434 U.S. 321, 326 (1977). But see Regents of University of
California v. Bakke, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2758 n.44 (1978).
131 In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973), Justice Powell's
opinion for a unanimous Court stated that "Griggs was rightly concerned that childhood deficiencies in the education and background of minority citizens, resulting from forces beyond
their control, not be allowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens for
the remainder of their lives." See also 98 S.Ct. at 2758 n.44.
132 E.g., 434 U.S. 321; Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405. (1975).
133 422 U.S. 405. In light of the equitable nature of Title VII remedies, however, the
defendant's good faith may be considered by the court in connection with its decision on back
pay. See City of Los Angeles, Dept. of Water v. Manhart, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 1380-83 (1978).
134 See Lopatka, supra note 100, at 135-36.
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whether such affirmative action is consistent with Title VII' 5
With many of these skirmishes resolved, most of the post-Griggs battles have
been fought over what constitutes sufficient proof to establish "discriminatory
effect" in a Title VII case and, once this is done, how a defendant is to meet its
burden of proving "business necessity." Plaintiffs have been allowed to prove
discriminatory effect and thus establish a prima facie Title VII case by two
different methods: disparate impact and minority underrepresentation. The
first approach, which was used in Griggs, examines the racial effect of a job
requirement by comparing the percentage of blacks that are excluded by the
requirement against the percentage of whites who fail it.' A prima facie case of
discrimination may also be established by proof that minorities are under-

represented in the defendant's work force compared to the racial composition

of the overall community from which it hires." 7 This second method of proving
discriminatory effect was developed by the lower courts on their own after
The theory
Griggs," s8 and the Supreme Court only recently approved it.'
underlying this approach is that "absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force
more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population
in the community from which employees are hired."' 40
Both disparate impact and minority underrepresentation may be used in
a single case if the relevant data is available. In theory at least, if either of them
establishes discriminatory effect, the burden should shift to the defendant to
show business necessity. In fact, however, when the results of these methods of
proof conflict, a difficult problem may arise. For example, it is not clear that an
135 The Supreme Court did make clear in Griggs that "the Act does not command that any
person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he
is a member of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has proscribed." 401 U.S. at 430-31. In McDonald
v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), the Court held that Title VII
and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) both protect whites from racial discrimination, but it specifically
cautioned that it was not considering the legality of an affirmative action program, "whether
judicially required or otherwise prompted." Id. at 276. Cf. 98 S.Ct. 2733 (specific affirmative
action program held to violate Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
136 Disparate impact was the basis of the Supreme Court's finding of discriminatory effect
in Griggs. The Court's opinion noted that Duke Power's high school diploma requirement was
met by 34% of the white males in the state, but only by 12% of the blacks. 401 U.S. at 430
n.6. The Court also cited statistics indicating that the use of a battery of standardized tests,
including the two used by Duke Power, resulted in a much lower pass rate for blacks than for
whites. Id. The validity of the disparate impact approach was recently reaffirmed by the
Court in a Title VII case involving sex discrimination. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 434 U.S. 321
(1977). See generally Shoben, supra note 96, at 6-8.
137 See generally Shoben, supra note 96, 8-9. Minority underrepresentation may also be
referred to as the "community composition comparison" approach. See id. at 9.
138 See cases cited id. at 8 n.29.
139 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299
(1977).
140 433 U.S. at 440 (quoting 431 U.S. at 339 n.20). Difficulties may exist, of course, in
defining the relevant labor market (see Shoben, supra note 96, 12-19) and in determining
whether "the claimed discriminatory pattern is a product of pre-Act hiring rather than unlawful post-Act discrimination" (433 U.S. at 442. See also 431 U.S. at 430.), but this minority
underrepresentation approach is now well established as a way of proving discriminatory effect
in a Title VII case.
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employment test violates Title VII just because whites do better on it than blacks
if the company's overall selection procedures result in a work force that reflects
the racial composition of the community. The question of whether to focus on
the impact of a single requirement or of the employer's overall hiring practices
has divided the lower courts and federal agencies,' 4 ' and the Supreme Court has
yet to decide the matter." 2
Whichever method of analyzing the proof of discriminatory effect is used, a
court must also determine how much discrepancy in the comparable statistics is
sufficient to establish a Title VII violation. In Griggs, the Supreme Court relied
on statistics showing high school completion rates of 34% for white males in the
state compared with 12% for blacks and a pass rate on the standardized test of
58% for whites versus 6% for blacks to conclude that both requirements disqualified blacks "at a substantially higher rate" than whites.'43 No effort was
made in the opinion to quantify exactly what "substantially" meant. The lower
courts have generally not tried to precisely define this concept either,' but the
results reached in their various Title VII decisions have created a body of law
indicating that very little difference in black-white pass rates is needed to trigger
the requirement that the defendant show job relatedness. 5 One solution might
have been to make the standards for evaluating the business necessity defense turn
on how severe the discriminatory effect of the challenged practice was shown to
be. For the most part, however, the lower courts have not related the two steps
of the Griggs analysis to each other. Rather they have first determined whether
the statistics show a large enough discrepancy in the way whites and blacks are
treated for the "discriminatory effect" label to be applied and then have conducted a separate inquiry concerning the job relatedness of the test under review.
The business necessity defense has come to include three distinct elements."'
First, the employment practice at issue must actually serve a business purpose; it
is not sufficient that the employer sincerely intended that the practice be helpful.
In Griggs, for example, the Supreme Court rejected Duke Power's argument that
its diploma and testing requirements were protected by the fact that they were
undertaken to upgrade the quality of the work force, because the company had
failed to establish that the requirements were in fact related to successful per141 See authorities cited at Lopatka, supra note 100, at 79-80 n. 50 & 51.
142 For discussions of the issue of whether to focus on the racial impact of a single requirement or of the overall results of the defendant's hiring practices, see Shoben, supra.note 96, at
25-32 (taking the position that an overall results approach is unsatisfactory) and Lopatka,
supra note 100, 79-81 (taking the position that "[a]n entirely logical solution to this problem
may not exist." Id. at 81).
143 401 U.S. at 426, 430 n.6. See also id. at 429 (the standardized test rendered "ineligible
a markedly disproportionate number of Negroes").
144 See Lopatka, supra note 100, at 74 n.26.
145 See, e.g., Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1171 (2d Cir. 1972) (passing
rate for whites 11/2 times greater than passing rate for blacks). Cases in which discriminatory
effect has been shown by the minority underrepresentation approach (see note 140 supra)
have usually involved rather severe disparities between the -racial compositions of the defendant's work force and the relevant labor market. See cases cited in note 140 supra;Lopatka,
supra note 100, at 76 n.36, 77-78.
146 See generally Lopatka, supra note 100, at 82-89.
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formance of the jobs for which they were used.' 47 The lower courts have added
two other elements to the business necessity defense that go beyond anything
found in the Griggs opinion. They have held that in order for an employment
practice to be protected by business necessity, it must be urgent or essential to the
business, and furthermore there must be no acceptable alternative available to
the company
that would accomplish the same business purpose with a lesser racial
14 8
impact.
Considering such factors, of course, may require a court to evaluate the
costs, efficiency, and even safety of actual and potential employment practices
and to balance these against the different racial impact of these alternative
practices in determining whether a business necessity defense has been established.
In these circumstances, which party has the burden of proof may be of critical
importance. Griggs makes clear that the burden of showing job relatedness is on
the employer. 9 Even if the Supreme Court accepts the additional elements
written into the business necessity defense by the lower courts, however, it does not
necessarily follow that the burden with respect to the existence of a less discriminatory alternative will also be placed on the defendant. 5
D. Suits by the FederalGovernment: "Patternor Practice"
Versus "Accidental" Discrimination
Both Title VII and Title VIII provide for enforcement of their substantive
sections by "pattern or practice" suits brought by the federal government as well
The government enforceas by ordinary claims brought by private plaintiffs.'
See 401 U.S. at 431-32, 436.
"Prior to Griggs, high school educations and general intelligence tests were
widely assumed to be good general predictors of ability. The decision in Griggs
impels the conclusion that unsupported stereotypical assumptions will not suffice to
demonstrate the requisite relationship between the employment practice and a
business purpose."
Lopatka, supra note 100, at 83.
148 See generally Lopatka, supra note 100, at 84-89. Thus, for example, in Johnson v. Pike
Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971), the court held that the disparate
impact of a company's practice of discharging employees for multiple garnishments could not
be justified by the time and expense involved in garnishment procedures, nor by the possible
loss of the garnished employee's efficiency, which the court considered to be a price that Congress felt must be paid to end discrimination.
149 See 401 U.S. at 432.
150 Cf. 422 U.S. at 436 (indicating that if the defendant proves that its test is job related,
the plaintiff may still establish a Title VII violation by showing that alternative selection procedures were available to the company).
151 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970) (Title VII) and 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970) (Title
VIII). T1[he relevant provision of the Fair Housing Act provides that the Attorney General
may bring a civil action in two types of cases: (1) when any person "is engaged in a pattern
or practice of resistance to the full enjoyment of any of the rights granted by this subchapter";
or (2) when "any group of persons has been denied any of the rights granted by this subchapter
and such denial raises an issue of general public importance." 42 U.S.C. § 3613 (1970). The
government enforcement section of Title VII is more restrictive. Title VII authorizes federal
suits against persons who are "engaged in a pattern or practice of resistance" to the law, but
only where that pattern or practice "is of such a nature and is intended to deny" the rights
protected by the statute. Nothing comparable to the Fair Housing Act's second option involving cases with issues of general public importance is provided for in Title VII.
147
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ment provisions of the two statutes are worded somewhat differently, but they
both require a finding of more generalized discrimination by the defendant than
do private suits. This has led the Supreme Court in Title VII cases to distinguish
between governmental claims, which it has held require proof of discriminatory
intent, and private suits, which may be based on Griggs' nonmotivational "disSince a similar distinction exists in the Fair Housing
parate impact" theory.'
Act, these employment cases suggest that a discriminatory effect theory should be
adopted in appropriate private Title VIII cases as well.
The government enforcement provision in Title VII, unlike its counterpart
This alone
in the Fair Housing Act, explicitly includes an intent requirement.'
would be sufficient to require proof of discriminatory purpose in a Title VII case
brought by the United States. But in holding that racial motive must be shown
in such a case, the Supreme Court has focused not on this explicit intent requirement, but rather on the "pattern or practice" language that is common to
both Title VII and Title VIII. This phrase, the Court recently held, means that
the government must "prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or
'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts."' 54 Racial discrimination must be
shown to be "the company's standard operating procedure-the regular rather
than the unusual practice."'5 5
The Supreme Court's definition of "pattern or practice" in government suits
implies that in a private suit under either Title VII or Title VIII, "accidental"
or unusual acts, if discriminatory, would be held unlawful. Certainly this would
be true, if the isolated act involved intentional discrimination. Even though
it would be inappropriate for the government to sue a company whose bigoted
manager once rejected a qualified black applicant it does not mean that the
applicant himself would not have a good cause of action. But this would be a
case of purposeful discrimination, not one based on discriminatory effect. The
Title VIII pattern or practice suits are brought by the Attorney General, who also originally had the responsibility for such suits under Title VII. In the 1972 amendments to Title
VII, this responsibility was transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
See § 5 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat.
107 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (1970)), and 431 U.S. at 329 n.1.
152 See, e.g., 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15.
153 See note 151 supra.
154 431 U.S. at 336. See also id. at 336-37 n.16.
155 Id. at 336. In developing this definition of "pattern or practice," the Supreme Court
cited similar interpretations of this phrase in a variety of civil rights contexts, including one in
a fair housing case. Id. (citing United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corporation, 437 F.2d
221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971 )). This citation may be taken to suggest that the government's proof
in a Title VIII case is to be tested by the same purposeful discrimination standard that applies
in comparable Title VII cases, even though the intent requirement spelled out in Title VII
was not specifically included in the Fair Housing Act. See note 151 supra. Lower courts in
Title VIII cases brought by the Attorney General, however, have often held that discriminatory effect, not purpose, is the touchstone in these cases. E.g., United States v. City of Black
Jack, Missouri, 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975). See also
United States v. Grooms, 348 F. Supp. 1130 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. Real Estate
Development Corporation, 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972). Indeed, in the fair housing
field thus far, the discriminatory effect theory has been more commonly relied on in government enforcement actions than in private suits, because sufficient statistical data to establish
discriminatory effect is more often available in the "big" pattern or practice case than it is in
a private dispute.
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fact that a single, irregular, intentionally racial incident violates Title VIII does
not mean that the effect theory of discrimination accepted in Griggs necessarily
applies to fair housing cases. Griggs, in fact, was concerned not with an unusual
act, but with an intentionally adopted company policy whose unintended racial
results were held unlawful.
Still, the notion that "accidental" discrimination may violate the Fair Housing Act seems to carry with it a concept of discrimination that is not based on the
defendant's illicit motivation. It is noteworthy in this context that the lower
courts have been unanimous in holding property owners and real estate firms
liable under Title VIII for the discriminatory housing practices of their agents
5
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.'"
The agents' discrimination in these
cases is invariably intentional, but liability is also imposed on the principal regardless of whether he was aware of his agent's unlawful conduct or not. The
only limitation on this doctrine is that the courts have generally not permitted
punitive damage to be awarded against a vicariously liable defendant,'
but
otherwise he is fully responsible for discrimination he may have known nothing
about. As noted above, this very possibility of distinguishing between defendants
who are liable for punitive damages and those who are not suggests that the Fair
Housing Act may be violated without an intent to discriminate.
E. Suits Against Local Governments: The Two-Standard Approach
The legislative history of Title VIII discussed above demonstrates a congressional intention to subject governmental agencies and officials as well as
private defendants to the commands of the new law. Unlike Title VII, which
was initially limited to private employers, 5 ' the Fair Housing Act has never
exempted government bodies from its coverage. Indeed, the first appellate
decision to conclude that housing practices with discriminatory effects violate
Title VIII involved a municipal defendant, 55 and since then the principal fair
housing cases that have accepted this nonmotivational theory of discrimination
have resulted from challenges to exclusionary zoning by local governments."'
1. Washington v. Davis
The very fact that Title VII was not extended to governmental employers
until 1972 resulted in a number of significant developments in civil rights law
156 See, e.g., Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482, 485 (7th Cir. 1975); Marr v. Rife, 503
F.2d 735, 740-42 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Youritan Construction Company, 370
F. Supp. 643, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd as modified, 509 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1975) (and
cases cited therein).
157 See, e.g., Fort v. White, 530 F.2d 1113, 1116-17 (2nd Cir. 1976); Marr v. Rife,
503 F.2d 735, 744-45 (6th Cir. 1974).
158 The 1972 amendments to Title VII extended its coverage to state and municipal
employees by removing the exemption of state and political subdivisions as employers that was
written into the original law. See Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L.No.
92-261, § 2(1)-(2), 86 Stat. 107 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a)-(b) (1970)).
159 436 F.2d 108. See also 508 F.2d 1179.
160 See cases cited at note 12 supra, and text accompanying notes 370-407 infra.
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generally that are relevant to the interpretation of the Fair Housing Act. Numerous complaints of racial discrimination in public employment were filed before
the 1972 amendments to Title VII, but they were based not on Title VII, but
on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Some of these
claims were also brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981,"1 the contract rights section
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, whose companion section dealing with property
& 2
rights
1
bans racial discrimination in housing. 6 Many of these cases were
similar to Griggs in that they involved challenges to employment tests that disproportionately excluded black applicants from police, fire, and other municipal
jobs.1 4 The lower courts that passed on these equal protection claims in the
early 1970's generally held that, even though Title VII did not apply, the discriminatory effect analysis of Griggs should be followed because there was "no
distinction between the constitutional standard and the statutory standard under
Title VII. "' 6
In 1976, this conclusion was reversed by the Supreme Court in Washington
v. Davis,'6 6 which upheld the validity of a verbal ability test used by the District
of Columbia police department to screen its recruits. The Court drew a distinction in Davis between an equal protection claim, which it held could only be
based on purposeful discrimination, and a Title VII claim of the type sustained in
Griggs, for which discriminatory purpose need not be proved.'6 7 In so doing, the
Court reaffirmed that Title VII prohibits employment practices that disqualify
substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks, unless the practices are validated in terms of job performance.' 6 8 "However this process proceeds," Justice
White wrote in describing the "more rigorous" Title VII standard, "it involves
a more probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable
acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Constitution
where special racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed."' 69
The Supreme Court in Davis did apply the Title VII standards to the
plaintiffs' § 1981 claim.'
Nevertheless, this claim, too, failed on the merits.
Even though the police department's test excluded black applicants at a much
higher rate than whites,' 7' the Court upheld the test as job related, because its
161 "All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and
to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property
as is enjoyed by white citizens ..
" 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
162 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1970). Section 1982 provides: "All citizens of the United States
shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof
to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
163 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969); 392 U.S. 409.
164 See, e.g., Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 957-59 n.2, n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd,
426 U.S. 229 (1976) (and cases cited therein). *
165 Id. at 958 n.2 and cases cited. See also the public employment cases cited at Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244 n.12 (1976).
166 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
167 Id. at 238-47.
168 Id. 246-47.
169 Id. at 247.
170 Id. at 248-52.
171 The failure rate of black applicants who took the challenged test was 57% as compared
to a failure rate of 13% for whites. Davis v. Washington, 512 F.2d 956, 958-59 (D.C. Cir.
1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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results were correlated to performance in the police training program."
Washington v. Davis is an extremely important decision. '" The significance
of its holding that proof of discriminatory purpose is necessary to establish an
equal protection violation is muted somewhat in the employment discrimination
context by the fact that Title VII now applies to public as well as private employers." 4 Presumably, Davis-type claimants will now rely on Title VII and §
1981 whenever possible instead of on the Equal Protection Clause. 5 A similar
result would follow in the housing discrimination field if it is ultimately decided
that Title VIII or § 1982 is governed by a discriminatory effect standard. But
Davis remains of vital importance as a general pronouncement on equal protection principles and on how these principles relate to the proper interpretation
of statutes designed to protect specific civil rights.
The significance of Davis for fair housing purposes lies in its conclusion that
the same practice may be judged by different standards, depending on whether
a constitutional challenge or a statutory claim is involved 76 and that the "more
rigorous" statutory standard does not require proof of discriminatory purpose.
The Supreme Court did uphold the police department's test against both types of
claims in Davis, so the suggested dichotomy between the constitutional and
statutory standards was arguably only dicta. But the strength of the Court's
commitment to two different standards seemed clear in Davis, 7 and a year later
in Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corp.,' the Court again suggested that this was the correct approach, this time in a housing discrimination
case.
2. Arlington Heights
Arlington Heights arose out of the efforts of Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (MHDC) to build a federally subsidized 190-unit townhouse development for low- and moderate-income tenants in the Chicago suburb
of Arlington Heights. The population of Arlington Heights in 1970 was about
172 426 U.S. 229, 249-52 (1976). The Supreme Court may decide this term whether the
discriminatory effect standard of Title VII-Griggs applies in an employment discrimination
case under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 3078 (1978).
173 See generally Schwemm, supra note 2.
174 See note 158 supra.
175 See Lopatka, supra note 100, at 113-17.
176 Cf. 98 S.Ct. at 2747: "In view of the clear legislative intent, Title VI [of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964] must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate
the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment." See also id. at 2767-68 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
177 Cf. General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), where the Court relied on
the reasoning in an equal protection case (Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974)) in holding that the exclusion of pregnancy from an employer's disability benefit plan did not constitute sex discrimination within the meaning of Title VII. Gilbert does not, however, necessarily
conflict with Davis' determination to judge equal protection cases by a purpose standard and
Title VII claims by an effect standard. The Court held that the plaintiffs in Gilbert had not
even proven discriminatory effect, and that is why their Title VII claim failed. See City of
Los Angeles, Dept. of Water v. Manhart, 98 S.Ct. 1370, 1379 (1978). But see id. at 1383-84
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
178 429 U.S. 252.
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65,000 people, 99.9% of whom were white, but about 40% of those eligible to
be tenants in the MHDC development were blacks and Mexican-American
tenants, so it would increase the Village's minority population by over one
thousand percent." 9 The site chosen for the MHDC development was vacant,
but zoned for single-family purpose, and MHDC petitioned the Village for
rezoning. A number of public hearings were held, where the debate focused
not only on the merits of the requested rezoning, but also on the "social issue"whether racially integrated subsidized housing was desirable in Arlington
Heights.'
The Village had previously approved some 60 zoning changes for
market-rate apartment developers, 1' but it denied MHDG's petition. Thereafter, MHDC and three black prospective tenants brought suit in federal court,
seeking to have Arlington Heights enjoined from interfering with the proposed
development. The plaintiffs alleged that the Village's refusal to permit construction of the subsidized townhouses violated various constitutional and statutory
provisions, including the Equal Protection Clause and the Fair Housing Act.
The district court denied relief. 2 Applying an effect standard, it nevertheless held the plaintiffs had failed to make out a case of racial, as opposed to
merely economic, discrimination.' 8 ' The court also commented that, although
large groups of local residents opposed MHDC's petition because of opposition
to minority groups, this factor did not affect the municipal officials, who had
been "motivated .. .by a legitimate desire to protect property values and the
integrity of the Village's zoning plan."'8 4
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed.'
It held that the
Village's refusal to rezone violated the Equal Protection Clause because its effect
was, indeed, racially discriminatory and because that effect was not justified by
a compelling state interest.' 6 The court noted that although blacks accounted
for only 18% of the overall population of the Chicago metropolitan area, they
made up 40% of the low- and moderate-income residents who were eligible for
the housing proposed by MHDC and were thus affected by the Village's action.
Added to this disproportionate racial impact was the fact that the substantial
growth that Arlington Heights had enjoyed in recent years had been almost
totally limited to whites, making it the most racially segregated large municipality in the Chicago area.81 With one judge dissenting, the court of appeals
also found that the Village's refusal to permit construction of the MHDC
development effectively blocked the only chance to have any subsidized, integrated housing in Arlington Heights, thus perpetuating the area's massive residential segregation."' Having determined that the municipal action under
review was racially discriminatory, the court proceeded to evaluate Arlington
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186
187
188

517 F.2d at 414.
429 U.S. at 257-58.
517 F.2d at 412.
373 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill.
1974).
Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 211.
517 F.2d 409.
Id. at 412-15.
Id. at 414 n.1.
Id. at 414-15.
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Heights' claimed justifications for the refusal to rezone by the "compelling
interest" standard dictated by traditional equal protection analysis and found
that neither of the Village's defenses-maintaining the zoning plan and protecting neighboring property values-satisfied this standard.' 89
The Seventh Circuit's opinion dealt exclusively with equal protection issues.
Its failure to consider the plaintiffs' claim under the Fair Housing Act was later
criticized by the Supreme Court,' but in defense of the court of appeals, it
must be noted that the plaintiffs themselves had not viewed their statutory claim
as different from their equal protection claim.'
Indeed, the exclusionary land
use cases then being decided had rarely focused attention on the Fair Housing
Act as a separate basis of relief independent of the Equal Protection Clause." 2
Before the Supreme Court's decision in Washington v. Davis, litigants in these
cases apparently assumed that the standards for judging constitutional and Title
VIII claims were identical, as had their counterparts in public employment
cases where Griggs was thought to control. 9'
In its decision in Arlington Heights, however, the Supreme Court indicated
that the Title VIII claim should have been decided first' and also irfiplied that
it was to be judged by a different standard than the equal protection claim. The
Court reversed the Seventh Circuit's decision on the ground that the plaintiffs
95
had "simply failed to carry their burden of proving discriminatory purpose,"
as Washington v. Davis now required equal protection claimants to do. :"This
conclusion," Justice Powell's opinion stated, "ends the constitutional inquiry."106
But it did not end the case. Since there had yet to be a decision on plaintiffs'
allegation that the refusal to rezone violated the Fair Housing Act, the Supreme
Court remanded the case "for further consideration of respondents' statutory
claims."' 1
The Supreme Court's handling of the Arlington Heights case suggests that
the dichotomy between constitutional and statutory standards that it recognized
in Davis also exists in the fair housing field. Arlington Heights is the strongest
hint yet given by the Court that it would be appropriate to apply a "more
rigorous" standard than purposeful discrimination in Title VIII cases.9 8 A
189 Id. at 415.
190 "The Court of Appeals, . . . proceeding in a somewhat unorthodox fashion, did not
decide the statutory question." 429 U.S. at 271.
191 558 F.2d at 1286 n.2, 1287 n.3.
192 See text accompanying notes 408-415 infra.
193 See note 165, supra.
194 429 U.S. at 271.
195 Id. at 270.
196 Id. at 271.
197 Id. at 271.
198 There is also one hint to the contrary. In Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975), the
Court dismissed an equal protection challenge to an exclusionary zoning ordinance of a wealthy
Rochester, New York, suburb on standing grounds. In the course of his opinion for a 5-4
majority, Justice Powell refused to read the plaintiffs' complaint as stating a claim under the
Fair Housing Act in addition to its constitutional claim. Id. at 513 n.21. He emphasized the
"because of race" language of the operative provisions of Title VIII by way of contrasting its
requirements with the Warth claim, which was "that the challenged zoning practices have the
purpose and effect of excluding persons of low and moderate income from residing in the
town, and that this in turn has the consequence of excluding members of racial or ethnic
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number of lower courts have already cited Davis and Arlington Heights as
establishing this two-standard approach.199 For its part, the Seventh Circuit on
remand in Arlington Heights took the hint and decided that "at least under
some circumstances a violation of section 3604 (a) can be established by a showing of discriminatory effect without a showing of discriminatory intent."2 '
The court went on to hold that the discriminatory effect of the Village's refusal
to rezone violated Title VIII if no other suitable land was available in Arlington
Heights for the MHDC development, and it remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether other sites did exist. 2"' Thus, Arlington Heights
represents the most striking example to date of how the two-standard approach
can work: a municipal decision that complies with the Equal Protection Clause
may be unlawful under the Fair Housing Act.
3. The Rationale for the Two-Standard Approach
Neither of the Supreme Court's opinions in Davis or Arlington Heights
attempts to explain the theoretical basis for evaluating a statutory claim of racial
discrimination by a more rigorous standard than is appropriate for a constitutional claim. How can the same state action that is exonerated as nondiscriminatory for equal protection purposes be condemned as discriminatory under a
statute passed to enforce the Equal Protection Clause? The Davis opinion contains some clues. The principal reason offered by the Court for rejecting a discriminatory effect standard in equal protection cases was its fear of the "far
reaching" consequences of such a holding, which "would raise serious questions
about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service,
regulatory, and licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and
to the average black than to the more affluent white."' 2 This the Supreme Court
was unwilling to do on its own as a matter of constitutional interpretation. It
requires a far less activist Court, however, to give a remedial civil rights statute
designed to attack a particular type of discrimination a "far reaching" interpretation in accordance with its "clear congressional intent."'2' Griggs, after all, is
limited to employment discrimination cases, and if its adoption of a discriminatory effect standard for these cases is considered "wrong," Congress can correct
the matter by statute, a process infinitely easier than amending the Constitution.
To understand the Supreme Court's double standard approach as a matter
of judicial self-restraint, however, still does not provide it with any theoretical
minority groups .... We intimate no view as to whether, had the complaint alleged purposeful racial or ethnic discrimination, Metro-Act would have stated a claim under § 804." Id.
The implication of this comment in Warth appears to be that practices that have the "consequence" of excluding blacks would not violate Title VIII. Cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
199 E.g., 564 F.2d 126. Stingley v. City of Lincoln Park, 429 F. Supp. 1379 (E.D. Mich.
1977). Cf. United States v. City of Chicago, 549 F.2d 415, 435 (7th Cir. 1977) (employment
discrimination).
200 558 F.2d at 1290.
201 Id. at 1294-95.
202 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976).
203 See generally Yackle, The Burger Court, "State Action," and Congressional Enforcement of the Civil War Amendments, 27 ALA. L. REv.479 (1975).
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foundation. The reason that a practice may be prohibited by a specific civil rights
law while not violating the Equal Protection Clause is, Davis implies, because
Congress intended the statutory standard to be more rigorous." 4 Although the
Court did not say so, the congressional power to set this higher standard is presumably derived from the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment," 5
which has been held in other contexts to authorize Congress to outlaw practices
that would not themselves violate the amendment.200
For example, in Katzenbach v. Morgan,0 7 the issue was the constitutionality
of a provision of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that prohibited New York from
requiring certain persons educated in Spanish-speaking schools to pass a literacy
test in order to vote. Seven years before, the Court had decided that a similar
voting requirement did not itself violate the Equal Protection Clause.20 8 In
Morgan, therefore, New York argued that Congress, which had enacted the
Voting Rights Act pursuant to the enforcement clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, lacked the power to suspend the state's literacy test, but the Supreme Court
upheld the statute. According to Justice Brennan's opinion, the enforcement
clause empowered Congress to remedy past equal protection violations that it
reasonably believed may have reduced the political power of Puerto Ricans in
New York. Furthermore, the congressional enforcement power included the
right to find, contrary to the Court's earlier decision, that the literacy test did
deny equal protection, and since there was a rational basis for this finding, the
Court accepted it.20'
In short, Congress has the power to decide what "appropriate means" are
necessary to enforce the Equal Protection Clause.21 ° As Morgan held, the enforcement clause "is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to
exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment." 21 ' Morgan authorizes
Congress to enact appropriate civil right legislation extending minority rights,
even to the point of prohibiting conduct that would not itself violate the Equal
Protection Clause. With respect to Title VII, this means that once it is de204 See 426 U.S. at 246-48. Cf. 98 S.Ct. at 2747, holding that Congress intended Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to be governed by the equal protection standard. See also id.
at 2767-68 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
205 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 5, provides: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."
206 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966); Jones v. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (13th amendment); South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (15th amendment).
207 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
208 Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
209 384 U.S. at 653-56.
210 Id.
211 384 U.S. at 651. Justice Harlan's dissent in Morgan expressed the fear that this discretion might give Congress the power to retract, as well as extend, the protections afforded by
the 14th amendment (id. at 659, 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting)), but the Court's opinion
argued that Congress would not be permitted to dilute the constitutional guarantees. Id. at
651 n.10. The enforcement power was to be a one-way street only. But see Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112 (1970); Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975).
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termined-as it was in Griggs"'-that Congress intended for employment
practices to be judged by a more rigorous standard than was applicable in equal
protection cases, the constitutional question under Morgan becomes only whether
there is some rational basis for this determination." 3 If equal protection claims
were limited to those cases where purposeful discrimination could be proved, as
Davis was to hold, it would certainly be rational for Congress to decide that a
more rigorous standard was needed to root out all vestiges of discrimination in
public employment. In addition, the Supreme Court conceded in Davis that the
many lower court decisions applying a discriminatory effect test to equal protection challenges in public employment cases, though wrong, "impressively demonstrate that there is another side to the issue.""' 4 A similar conclusion by Congress
would surely be considered at least "rational.""'
Similar arguments concerning the Fair Housing Act would support the constitutionality of the more rigorous effect standard in the housing discrimination
field as well, assuming, of course, that the Supreme Court takes the initial step of
holding that Congress intended Title VIII to be governed by such a standard.
The legislative history of the Act clearly demonstrates the need for a strong
mechanism to combat discrimination by local governments, particularly in a case
like Arlington Heights where exclusionary zoning is involved."'
Indeed, the constitutional case for an effect standard under Title VIII may
actually be stronger than it is for Title VII, because of the additional authorization for the housing statute in the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth Amendment."' When the Fair Housing Act was being considered, the congressional
power to enact it was generally thought to be derived from the commerce clause
and § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,"' which were also the bases for Title
VII. Shortly after Title VIII was passed, however, the Supreme Court decided
Jones v.Mayer Co.,"' which held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 and § 1982) "bars all racial discrimination, public as well as private,
in the sale or rental of property, and that the statute, thus construed, is a valid
exercise of the power of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.""'
Thereafter, lower courts faced with constitutional challenges to the Fair Housing
Act relied on Jones to hold that Title VIII was also an appropriate exercise of
congressional power under the enforcement clause of the Thirteenth as well as

212 The reference is to the principle of Griggs that Title VII prohibits discriminatory
effects, not to the specific facts involved in that case. Griggs, itself, was concerned with a
private defendant, and the constitutional basis for Title VII's application to private employers
is the commerce clause, not the 14th Amendment. Cf., Heart of Atlanta Motel v. McClung,
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). Title VII, however,
also applies to governmental employers. See note 165 supra.
213 See 384 U.S. at 653-56.
214 426 U.S. at 245.
215 Cf. 384 U.S. at 653-56.
216 See discussion of legislative history, text accompanying notes 86-93 supra.
217 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2. Section 2 provides: "Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation."
218 See, e.g., Dubofsky, supra note 55, at 152 n.15.
219 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
220 Id. at 413. See also id. at 437-44.
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the Fourteenth Amendment."'- Thus, even if civil rights statutes passed pursuant
to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment were thought to be limited to banning
purposeful governmental discrimination that would itself violate that amendment, Title VIII might still constitutionally be held to bar public and private
housing discrimination based on a more rigorous standard pursuant to the
Thirteenth Amendment.
Jones, of course, involved intentional discrimination. The Supreme Court's
opinion did not state whether a purpose or effect standard was appropriate under
§ 1982 (or for that matter under the substantive provisions of the Thirteenth
Amendment), but at least the Court has not yet held that it is limited to purposeful discrimination as is the Equal Protection Clause after Davis. In light of
Katzenbach v. Morgan, however, it seems unlikely that the Thirteenth Amendment's additional source of congressional power for Title VIII and § 1982 would
be needed to sustain the double standard approach in a fair housing case, but it
is available.
4. The Civil Rights Act of 1866: Is There a Third Standard?
Beginning with its decision in Jones v. Mayer Co.,22 the Supreme Court has
resurrected the Civil Rights Act of 1866 by holding that it provides a private
right of action for victims of racial discrimination in employment. 3 and in
housing. 224 In both fields, the Court has made clear that the rights created by
by the passage of the more
the 1866 law are independent of and not limited
22 s
detailed provisions of Title VII and Title VIII.
The independence of § 1982 and Title VIII is particularly important when
a housing discrimination case is covered by one statute, but not the other. This
may happen in a number of different ways. For example, unlike Title VIII,
§ 1982 does not prohibit discrimination based on religion or national origin, nor
does it specifically cover discriminatory advertising or financial arrangements.22 6
On the other hand, § 1982 is broader than Title VIII in some respects, because
it is not subject to the short 180-day statute of limitations227 or to the exemp221 See, e.g., Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 825 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1021 (1974); United States v. Bob Lawrence Realty, Inc., 474 F.2d 115, 120-21 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 826 (1973); United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 214-15 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 934 (1972); Mayers v. Ridley, 465 F.2d 630 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(en bane) (Wilkey, J., concurring).
222 392 U.S. 409.
223 427 U.S. 273; Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
224 396 U.S. 229; 392 U.S. 409.
225 See 392 U.S. at 416-17 n.20 (citing a section of Title VIII that provides that "[n]othing
in this title shall be construed to invalidate or limit any law of ... any ... jurisdiction in which
this title shall be effective, that grants, guarantees, or protects the rights . . . granted by this
title." 42 U.S.C. § 3615 (1970)); 421 U.S. at 459-60.
226 See 392 U.S. at 413. Nor does § 1982 provide for enforcement by the Attorney General,
HUD, or any other federal agency. Its only means of enforcement is by private suits. See id.
at 413-14.
227 Section 1982 does not provide for a particular statute of limitations. In these circumstances, the courts apply the statute of limitations of the most analogous state law. See Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 180 (1976); 421 U.S. at 462. In fair housing cases, the applicable
state statute has often been longer than Title VIII's 180-day limitation period (42 U.S.C. §§
3610, 3612 (1970)). See, e.g., Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass'n, 559
F.2d 894 (3rd Cir. 1977); Hickman v. Fincher, 483 F.2d 855 (4th Cir. 1973).
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tions"s that were written into the Fair Housing Act. Furthermore, § 1982 covers
all real and personal property, not just housing, and its guarantees include the
right to "hold," "sell," and "convey" property as well as the right to purchase
and lease it." 9 Even in housing discrimination cases under both Title VIII and
§ 1982, the independence of the two laws may be important with respect to
relief, because punitive damages220 and attorneys fees23' are available through §
1982 without the limitations that apply to these remedies under Title VIII."'
These differences in Title VIII and § 1982 make it at least conceivable that
the standard of proof under the two statutes could also vary. As in the case of
Title VIII, there would seem to be three possible standards under § 1982:
(1) discriminatory purpose, as required for equal protection claims by Washington v. Davis; (2) unjustified discriminatory effect, as applied to Title VII cases
by Griggs; and (3) something else, perhaps an intermediate standard.
For its part, the Supreme Court has yet to declare whether a showing of
discriminatory effect would be sufficient to establish a § 1982 violation. The
Court's modern § 1982 cases have all dealt with intentional discrimination, 2 '
and it has not had occasion to comment on the proper standard in an effect case
under the old law. 2 4 There is a clue, however, in Washington v. Davis."5 There,
the Court applied the Griggs standards to a § 1981 claim, albeit an unsuccessful
one. 3 Since the Court has elsewhere indicated that § 1981 and § 1982 should
be interpreted in a like manner, 2 7 Davis suggests that the proper standard under
§ 1982 should also be derived from Griggs.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of an effect test for § 1982 cases
is that clarity and simplicity would best be served if the same standard applied in
similar suits under Title VIII and § 1982. (This argument, of course, presup228 See, e.g., Morris v. Cizek, 503 F.2d 1303 (7th Cir. 1974), holding that the "Mrs.
Murphy" exemption in Title VIII (42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1970)) covering owner-occupied
apartment buildings with less than four units is not available as a defense in a § 1982 suit.
See also Johnson v. Zaremba, 381 F. Supp. 165, 167 (N.D. Ill. 1973) and cases cited therein.
229 See note 162 supra. See, e.g., Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410
U.S. 431 (1972); 396 U.S. 229.
230 See, -e.g., Lee v. Southern Home Sites Corp., 444 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1971); Wright v.
Kaine Realty, 352 F. Supp. 222 (N.D. Il. 1972).
231 In 1976, Congress amended 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) to provide that in any action
under § 1982 (and other enumerated civil rights acts), "the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs." This
amendment has been held to be retroactively applicable to a § 1982 case that was pending on
the date of its enactment. See Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159, 163 (5th Cir. 1977). See also
Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977) ; Hughes v. Repko, 578 F.2d 483, 488 (3rd
Cir. 1978).
232 Under Title VIII, a punitive damage award may not exceed $1,000 and a prevailing
plaintiff may be awarded attorney's fees only if "the said plaintiff in the opinion of the court
is not financially able to assume said attorney's fees." 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970).
233 See 410 U.S. 431; 396 U.S. 229; 392 U.S. 409.
234 Justice Stewart's opinion in Jones did state that § 1982 "must encompass every racially
motivated refusal to sell or rent" (392 U.S. at 421-22), but nothing was said about practices
with discriminatory effects that were not racially motivated. See note 172 supra.
235 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
236 Id. at 248-52.
237 See 427 U.S. at 171-72; 410 U.S. at 439-40. See also id. at 190 (Stevens, J., concurring) : "[I]t would be most incongruous to give these two sections a fundamentally different
construction."
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poses that Griggs is ultimately extended to Title VIII.) The overlapping relationship of the two statutes is confusing enough without having two different
standards apply in a given type of housing discrimination case. Admittedly,
the desire to avoid conflicting guidelines did not prevent the Supreme Court
from developing a two-standard approach in Davis, but the rationale for that
approach-that it is up to Congress to provide for a more rigorous standard than
the constitutional one of purposeful discrimination--does not apply when the
comparison is between two statutes. Here, the question simply becomes a matter
of congressional intent.
Doubtless the Congress that passed the 1866 law was primarily concerned
with the most egregious forms of intentional discrimination and never even considered the purpose-or-effect issue.23 Nevertheless, it is clear that the Reconstruction Congress sought to establish "a broader principle than would have been
necessary simply to meet the particular and immediate plight of the newly freed
'
Negro slaves."239
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was intended to abolish the
"badges and incidents of slavery."24 In Jones, the Supreme Court held that
private racial discrimination in housing is one of the badges and incidents of
slavery intended to be eradicated by § 1982.41 After Jones, it is not a big step
to conclude that a housing practice that has the effect of discriminating against
blacks "too is a relic of slavery."24
The Supreme Court has already held that the congressional concerns underlying § 1982 were similar to those that gave rise to the Fair Housing Act. For
example, Title VIII was intended "to replace the ghettos by truly integrated and
balanced living patterns,"2 " while § 1982 was concerned with "racial discrimination [that] herds men into ghettos and makes their ability to buy property
turn on the color of their skin. . .

." "

The Court has also noted that a "narrow

construction of the language of § 1982 would be quite inconsistent with the broad
and sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded" by it,24 while
describing the language of Title VIII as "broad and inclusive" and entitled to
a "generous construction."24
An argument might be made that the Fair Housing Act should be governed
by a more rigorous standard than § 1982, because exemptions and limitations in
the newer law reflect a congressional desire to apply a more lenient test in those
cases excluded from its coverage. There are two problems with this argument.
First, its rationale would also justify reading the Title VIII limitations into §
1982, which the courts have already held to be inappropriate."' Second, an
effect standard would probably not be of much practical significance unless Title
238 See Note, Racially Disproportionate Impact of Racially Neutral Practices What
Approach Under 42 U.S.C. Sections 1981 and 1982?, 1977 DUxE L. J. 1267, 1278-80 (1977).
239 427 U.S. at 296. See also Note, supra note 238, at 1278, 1284-87.
240 392 U.S. at 439-41; see Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20-22 (1883).
241 392 U.S. at 439-41.
242 Id. at 443.
243 409 U.S. at 211 (quoting 114 CONG. Rac. 2706, 3422 (1968)).
244 392 U.S. at 442-43.
245 396 U.S. at 238.
246 409 U.S. at 209, 212.
247 See notes 225, 227, 228, 230 & 231 supra.
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VIII also applied. A § 1982 case against an individual homeowner or small
landlord who is not covered by Title VIII24 . would almost surely have to be
based on purposeful discrimination, not just effect, because proving discriminatory effect requires a large, defendant who has made a sufficient number of
decisions to establish a statistically significant pattern. Similarly, the greater
availability of punitive damages under § 1982 would be relevant only in cases
where racial intent is shown. Thus, it is unlikely that applying a discriminatory
effect standard to § 1982 as well as to the Fair Housing Act would result in imposing liability on any defendant who would not also be held liable under Title
VIII.
Before the Supreme Court decided Davis, the lower courts certainly made
no attempt to devise or apply a different standard of proof under § 1982 than
under Title VIII. No distinction was made between the two in suits brought
under both statutes,249 and where § 1982 alone was involved, it was held to
proscribe more than just intentional discrimination."' After Davis, however,
there have been a number of lower court decisions distinguishing between the
Title VIII and § 1982 standards and indicating that proof of racial intent is
required in a § 1982 case.2"1 Most of these decisions simply assume that the old
statute must be governed by Davis' interpretation of the equal protection
standard, which is rather surprising since § 1982 was not enacted pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment252 and since Davis itself shows that suits against
government defendants are to be judged by a more rigorous standard
under § 1981 than under the Equal Protection Clause. These courts have also
failed to analyze the legislative history or congressional purposes behind § 1982,
which, as shown above, could well support an effect test in § 1982 cases.2" 3
Thus, their conclusion that purposeful discrimination is required under § 1982
is not based on a proper analysis of the statute and is therefore unlikely to be the
2 54
final word on the matter.
In any event, no one has suggested that the proper standard in a § 1982
case should be based on some third approach different from either Griggs or
Davis. 55 Whatever standard is ultimately held to govern § 1982, it will almost
certainly be one of these two. And as between these two, it would seem more
appropriate to adopt the statutory rather than the equal protection test, and less
confusing as well.
248 See 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1970).
249 See, e.g., 499 F.2d 819; Johnson v. Jerry Pals Real Estate, 485 F.2d 528 (7th Cir.
1972).
1973); Williamson v. Hampton Management Co., 339 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Ill.
250 See, e.g.,
Clark v. Universal Builders, Inc., 501 F.2d 324 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1070 (1974). But see McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1088 (4th Cir. 1975) (en
banc), aff'd,'427 U.S. 160 (1976).
251 E.g., 429 F. Supp. at 1385; 425 F. Supp. at 1024; cf.Ortega v. Merit Ins. Co., 433 F.
Supp. 135, 143 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1977); cases cited at Note, supra note 238, at 1280 n.76.
252 392 U.S. 409.
253 See Note, supra note 238, at 1278, 1282, 1285-87.
254 See Note, supra note 238, at 1269, 1280-84, 1288; cf.Note, Section 1981 and the
Thirteenth Amendment After Runyon v. McCrary-On the Doorsteps of Discriminatory
Private Clubs, 29 STAN. L. REV. 747, 772 (1977).
255 But cf.426 U.S. at 255-56 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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F. Should the Employment Discrimination Analogy Apply
to Fair Housing Cases?
Much of this article thus far has been concerned with examining the
similarities in the language and purposes of Title VII and Title VIII and in the
relationship of these statutes to the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in order to determine if it would be appropriate
to apply Griggs to fair housing cases. Before concluding that the Title VII
standards do apply, however, it is necessary to ask whether the analogy of the
employment discrimination cases is an apt one. Housing discrimination and
employment discrimination are distinctly different fields, and the legal doctrines
applicable in one are not necessarily appropriate to the other.
The nature of the employment relationship differs from the relationship of
the parties to a housing transaction. First of all, employment always involves a
continuing relationship between a company and its employee, while the parties
to a house sale may have nothing to do with each other after the closing. Of
course, where a seller or developer provides his own financing or where an apartment rather than a house is involved, the relationship of the housing provider
to the housing consumer is ongoing. In these continuing relationships, the
developer or landlord has an obvious legitimate interest in the ability and desire
of the person he deals with to meet the financial and other obligations contracted
for, but this interest is no greater than the employer's interest in the ability and
motivation of his workers. If a company can be required to prove "business
necessity" under Title VII whenever its employment practices have a discriminatory effect on blacks, there is no apparent reason why a landlord should
not have the same burden under the Fair Housing Act. Indeed, as one commentator has pointed out, "the consequences of an error in admitting a tenant
do not seem nearly as severe as, for example, the consequences of an error in
hiring an unqualified airline pilot."' 6
Another difference in housing and employment is that, although both are
needed, employment may often be more difficult to secure: an employer "gives"
someone a job, but a real estate agent has to "sell" his client on a home. Of
course, employers as well as housing suppliers engage in substantial advertising,
and in today's tight housing market, a person might be as grateful for a good
home as a good job. The point is, however, that when a housing supplier refuses
to deal with a minority prospect, he is refusing to take that person's money, an
act that should create at least as much suspicion as an employer's refusal to hire
and pay a minority jobseeker.257
256 Comment, supra note 119, at 174. The example, of course, is an extreme one, since it
compares an average housing transaction to a terribly important employment decision. On the
other hand, it might be argued that the consequences of admitting a destructive tenant to a
luxury high rise apartment building could be more devastating than hiring an unqualified factory
worker. But the point of the tenant-airline pilot example -remains valid: the legitimate concerns of housing suppliers are not necessarily entitled to more consideration than are those of
employers under the civil rights acts.
257 See, e.g., Wang v. Lake Maxinhall Estates, Inc., 531 F.2d 832, 836 (7th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 442 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
936 (1974); Allen v. Gifford, 368 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Va. 1973); Newbern v. Lake Lorelei,
Inc., 308 F. Supp. 407, 414-15 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
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There is also a difference in the nature of the typical defendant in housing
and employment discrimination cases. With few exceptions, housing is an
essentially local business, with real estate firms and housing suppliers generally
operating in only one geographic market. Most of the reported private fair
housing cases have been brought against small landlords and homesellers, while
the Title VII defendant is more often a large regional or even national company
or union with a substantial number of employees. This difference could be
relevant in terms of the initial fairness of adopting an effect standard in discrimination cases. One commentator has suggested that Griggs and the EEOC guidelines that supported that decision are appropriate in the labor field, because
large companies and unions had previously learned to live with a system of
detailed, federal interpretive regulations and to conform their practices to these
regulations through their experience with the National Labor Relations Act.258
Whatever the merit of this argument, however, it cannot serve to "protect" fair
housing defendants from a Griggs-type interpretation of Title VIII now. First
of all, the Griggs opinion itself did not rely on the "notice" given by the EEOC
guidelines to justify its effect standard. Second, just as the EEOC guidelines
forewarned Title VII defendants of the coming of Griggs, so should Griggs-now
seven years old and often reaffirmed-be considered fair warning that effect, not
purpose, may also govern housing discrimination cases. Finally, the small Title
VIII defendant has little to fear from an effect standard anyway, since it will
only be of practical importance in cases against large housing firms; discriminatory purpose will still govern the smaller cases." 9
If the nature of the housing and employment relationships do not justify a
different interpretation of Title VII and Title VIII, what of the differences in the
statutes themselves? The most important difference is that a person aggrieved
by a discriminatory employment practice under Title VII must file a complaint
with the EEOC before he is permitted to sue in court, while a victim of housing
discrimination is authorized by Title VIII to sue directly without pursuing any
administrative remedies."' The decision in Griggs to apply an effect test in Title
VII cases, however, had nothing to do with the statute's requirement of an
agency complaint, and there is no reason why the difference in the enforcement
schemes of Title VII and Title VIII should result in their substantive requirements being interpreted differently.
The Supreme Court has also noted that the languages of the respective
statutes dealing with relief "contrast sharply." ' ' Thus, a damage action under
Title VIII "sounds basically in tort" and is essentially legal,2"' while even
258 Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination,71 MicH. L. REV. 59, 69-71, 74, 97-98 (1972).
259 See text accompanying notes 155 and 248 supra.
260 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 3612 (1970) (Title VIII) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970)
(Title VII). See also Note, supra note 47, at 836-39, 848-59, 862-63. A victim of racial discrimination in employment may, however, bypass the procedural requirements of Title VII
and sue directly under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). See 421 U.S. at 457-60; Lopatka, supra
note 100, at 114.
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Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 197 (1974).

262

Id. at 195.
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monetary relief under Title VII has been characterized as equitable.26 This difference in how the two types of claims are characterized also seems unrelated
to whether Griggs should apply to Title VIII. Indeed, to the extent it is considered relevant to this problem, it would actually seem to cut in favor of an even
more rigorous standard under the Fair Housing Act than under Title VII, for,
as the Supreme Court has pointed out, the defendant's intent may be relevant to
a court of equity's decision concerning relief under Title VII," 4 but "[t]here is
no comparable discretion [under Title VIII]; if a plaintiff proves unlawful
discrimination and actual damages, he is entitled to judgment for that
amount."2'65
The issues that have emerged as important under Title VII and Title VIII
also differ. Almost all of the fair housing cases have involved only racial discrimination, while Title VII has also presented difficult questions concerning its
prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of sex266 and religion. 6 In addition, a number of major Title VII cases have involved the terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment, 6 8 not just the initial hiring decision, and although
the Fair Housing Act contains a similar provision guaranteeing equal treatment
Furthermore,
after housing is secured,269 this section has rarely been used.'
issues concerning proper relief have been given a great deal more attention under
Title VII, particularly the question of quotas and other preferential remedies,
which have been highly controversial in the employment field,27' but rarely

discussed in Title VIII cases."'
The most remarkable difference, however, is that the Supreme Court has

yet to decide a Title VIII case on the merits,7 while it has turned out numerous
opinions concerning what constitutes a Titie VII violation. The result is that
Title VII law has been substantially refined with respect to such matters as the
elements of a prima facie case, the proper use of statistical evidence, and the
proof necessary to establish discriminatory effect and the business necessity
defense, whereas no comparable Supreme Court guidance exists concerning the
substantive requirements of the Fair Housing Act.
The fact that different issues have become prominent under Title VII and
Title VIII is, of course, not a reason to limit Griggs to the employment discrim263 See id. at 196-97 and authorities cited id. at n.13; 98 S.Ct. at 1381.
264 98 S.Ct. at 1381-83.
265 415 U.S. at 197.
266 See generally Lopatka, supra note 100, at 94-101. The Fair Housing Act did not originally ban sex discrimination. In 1974, Title VIII was amended to include sex along with race,
color, religion, and national origin as prohibited bases for housing discrimination.
267 See generally Lopatka, supra note 100, at 101-13.
268 E.g., 98 S.Ct. 1370; 429 U.S. 125.
269 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1970). See also 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1970).
270 But see 484 F.2d 438.
271 See generally Lopatka, supra note 100, at 134-54.
272 Relief issues in fair housing cases have generally been limited to the question of damages
for the individual victim of housing discrimination (see, e.g., Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc.,
496 F.2d 1119 (7th Cir. 1974); Seaton v. Sky Realty Co., 491 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1974)) and
the question of how far a court should go in ordering injunctive relief to correct a past pattern
or practice of discrimination. E.g., 437 F.2d 221.
273 See note 17 supra.
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ination field. Rather, it simply demonstrates the greater concern the Supreme
Court has shown for Title VII cases and, correspondingly, the growing need for
a definitive statement by the Court concerning the meaning of the Fair Housing
Act.
When that statement does come, the analogy of Griggs and Title VII should
prove compelling: the "because of race" language is similar in both laws;. 4
Davis and Arlington Heights suggest that a more rigorous standard than purposeful discrimination is appropriate under both the employment and housing discrimination statutes; the related provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 are
similarly construed in the employment and housing fields; the Fair Housing Act,
like Title VII, is a remedial civil rights statute and as such is entitled to a
"generous construction"; 27 ' none of the differences between employment and
housing justify a fundamental difference in the interpretation of the two statutes;
and finally, and most importantly, the congressional desire to eradicate the
consequences of discrimination, not simply the motivation behind it, is just as
strong under Title VIII as it is under Title VII. Thus, the Fair Housing Act
should also be held to proscribe "not only overt discrimination
but also practices
76
that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.
III. Discriminatory Effect in Fair Housing Cases: Griggs Applied
A. The DiscriminatoryEffect Principlein DisparateTreatment Cases
An examination of the reported fair housing cases reveals only a few
decisions where application of the Griggs principle has been necessary to a holding of unlawful discrimination. A number of lower courts have mentioned that
"[p]ractices with discriminatory consequences are prohibited, irrespective of the
defendant's motivation,"27 7 but even in these cases, substantial proof of racial
intent was present. The lessons of Griggs have been helpful in some housing
discrimination cases, but, until recently, its actual holding has not been of great
significance, because most Title VIII suits have been based on purposeful discrimination.
Two early cases brought by the Attorney General are illustrative. In United
States v. Real Estate Development Corp.,7 5 there was overwhelming evidence of
intentional discrimination in the operation of the defendant's two apartment complexes in Columbus, Mississippi. No black had ever lived in these apartments,
even though blacks accounted for 37.6% of the town's population and a number
of them had applied to live in the defendant's buildings.7 9 The court found that
the defendant had openly discriminated prior to the effective date of Title VIII,
274 Similar language in Title VII and Title VIII has elsewhere been relied on by the
Supreme Court to give the two statutes a comparable interpretation. See 409 U.S. at 209.
275 409 U.S. at 212. See generally SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 72.05 at 391
(4th ed. 1973).
276 401 U.S. at 431.
277 347 F. Supp. at 782. See also United States v. Hughes Memorial Homes, 396 F. Supp.
544, 548 (W.D. Va. 1975) ; 484 F.2d at 443; 348 F. Supp. at 1133-34.
278 347 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
279 Id. at 779.
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and that thereafter, according to his own office manager, all of the blacks who
28 0
applied were turned away on the false ground that no vacancies were available.
The apartment owner did not even claim at trial that he would rent on a nondiscriminatory basis. 2"' The court held that the evidence of the defendant's discriminatory policy was "compelling."28 2 It also stated that proof of racial motivation was unnecessary under Griggs,28 ' but this conclusion was obviously
gratuitous.
The evidence of racial purpose may have been less compelling in United
States v. Grooms, 2 4 but it was nevertheless sufficient to establish that the defendants intentionally refused to rent spaces in their mobile home park to blacks.
Again, no black had ever been accepted as a tenant, and black applicants were
required to obtain two references from current residents of the park, while whites
were routinely admitted without any references. 8 5 The defendants denied that
they followed a discriminatory policy, but their criteria for evaluating prospective
tenants were admittedly subjective, and more extensive background checks were
made of applicants who defendants felt might not be "congenial" tenants.8 '
The court recognized that "the defendants have the right to formulate and
implement reasonable, objective, and nonracial rental standards and procedures,
and to inquire into the background and habits of prospective tenants and their
ability to pay."2
It held, however, that the defendants had not uniformly
applied their rental standards and that they had rejected black applicants on
racial grounds. As in Real Estate Development, the court's statement in Grooms
that "[t]he Fair Housing Act, like other civil rights laws, prohibits conduct with
28
discriminatory consequences as well as discriminatorily motivated practices1

was simply frosting on the cake.
Title VIII suits brought by private individuals, as well as enforcement
actions by the Attorney General, have generally been based on discriminatory
purpose. In most fair housing cases, the defendant's refusal to deal with a
minority homeseeker is easily established, and the real dispute centers around why
that refusal occurred. As the Grooms decision noted, if the defendant can
convince the court that he was simply applying reasonable, nonracial standards,
he is likely to prevail against a claim of discrimination.
There are two types of "legitimate excuses" that defendants in fair housing
cases regularly offer for theif refusal to deal: ( 1) the unit desired by the plaintiff
was not available at the time he applied ;289 and (2) there is something in280 Id. at 779-80.
281 Id. at 781, 785.
282 Id. at 784.
283 Id. at 782.
284 348 F. Supp. 1130 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
285 Id. at 1132-34.
286 Id. at 1133.
287 Id. at 1134.
288 Id. at 1133-34.
289 See, e.g., Smith v. Anchor Building Corp., 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976); Dillon v.
Bay City Construction, 512 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1975); 491 F.2d 634; 503 F.2d 735; 368 F.
Supp. 317; Jones v. Sciacia, 297 F. Supp. 165 (E.D. Mo. 1969), aff'd, 422 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.

1970).
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adequate or objectionable about the plaintiff (other than his race) as a prospective tenant.29 A combination of these two may appear to be involved when
the unit is rented to a third party that the landlord claims is better qualified than
the plaintiff, but this is really just a variation on the second reason.
The first type of excuse should be fairly easy to prove. Either the unit was
available when the -plaintiff applied or it was not, and this fact can be shown
through the defendant's own rental records, the use of white "testers," 29' and
other techniques. One caveat should be mentioned here. Proving nonavailability is not necessarily a complete defense in a fair housing case. If the defendant
withdraws the unit from the market because a black has applied, he would
violate Title VIII's prohibition against discriminatory refusals to negotiate.292
This provision might also require that a defendant with a large number of units
at his command not completely reject a minority homeseeker, even if a third
party has already secured the specific home desired by the plaintiff.292 After all,
as noted above,29 4 a landlord or housing developer in this position would
ordinarily be expected to pursue any interested prospect, and his failure to do so
might be evidence of a refusal to negotiate on the basis of race.
Judging the legitimacy of the second type of excuse is often more difficult,
because there are so many reasons that a defendant might have to object to a
prospective tenant. For example, defendants in fair housing cases have tried to
justify their rejection of minority homeseekers on the ground that the plaintiffs
were unmarried, 9 ' were unmarried women,296 were divorced men,29 7 were
students,298 were too young,299 had children or had too many children, °0 were
enlisted men in the military, 0 ' had failed to apply properly, 2 had lied or misrepresented themselves when applying,02 had become angry or unruly when
applying,0 4 or were unable to meet the necessary financial obligations.0
Defendants like the ones in Grooms have also claimed to base their rental decisions
on subjective feelings about the applicant, and the requirement of approval or
recommendation by the current residents of a condominium, trailer park, or
planned development obviously injects further subjective criteria into the selection process. 6
290 See, e.g., cases cited in notes 295-306 infra.
291 See note 41 supra.
292 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (1970).
293 See, e.g., 531 F.2d at 836.
294 See note 257 supra.
295 Lamb v. Sallee, 417 F. Supp. 282 (E.D. Ky. 1976).
296 339 F. Supp. 1146; Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436 F.2d 344 (7th Cir.
1970). But see note 266 supra.
297 562 F. 2d 550. But see note 266 supra.
298 Bishop v. Pecsok, 431 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Ohio 1976).
299 Bush v. Kaim, 297 F. Supp. 151 (N.D. Ohio 1969); Brown v. Lo Duca, 307 F. Supp.
102 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
300 Fred v. Kokinokos, 347 F. Supp. 942 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); 297 F. Supp. 151.
301 United States v. Henshaw Brothers, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 399 (E.D. Va. 1974).
302 531 F.2d 832; 525 F.2d 482.
303 Hall v. Freitas, 343 F. Supp. 1099 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
304
308 F. Supp. 407.
305 509 F. 2d 1110; 436 F.2d 344; 339 F. Supp. 1146; 343 F. Supp. 1099.
306 See, e.g., 559 F.2d 894; 531 F.2d 832; Pughsley v. 3750 Lake Shore Drive Cooperative
Bldg., 463 F.2d 1055 (7th Cir. 1972); 348 F. Supp. 1130; 308 F. Supp. 407.
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The defendant's nonracial excuse for not dealing with a black homeseeker
may seem unwarranted or even silly, but if it was in fact the reason for the
defendant's behavior and if he applied his standards in a nondiscriminatory
manner, he is likely to win. Again, the use of white testers is a helpful, if not
an indispensable, means of checking whether the defendant's standards were
indeed applied evenly, and again, the burden of proof on this "excuse" issue
should be on the defendant, because he has better access to the information and
because it is easier for him to establish his excuse than for the plaintiff to "prove
a negative" (i.e., that no reason other than race was involved in the defendant's
decision) .' The main point, however, is that the focus of this "disparate treatment" type of case is the defendant's intent. 0 8
Thus, the Title VII decision that is perhaps most relevant to the typical fair
housing case is not Griggs, but McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' ° where
the Supreme Court outlined the elements of a prima facie case in an individual
employment discrimination suit based on a disparate treatment theory. 10 The
gist of that decision is that if a qualified minority applicant is turned down for
an available job, "[t]he burden then must shift to the employer to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."''
That reason may be a subjective one, but it must in fact have been the basis for
the defendant's decision and not a pretext for racial discrimination." 2
The same "'prima facie" approach would be appropriate in evaluating the
proof in a disparate treatment case under the Fair Housing Act, as the Eighth
Circuit has held in Williams v. Matthews Ca."' and Smith v. Anchor Building
Corp."4 In Anchor Building, for example, Mrs. Smith's application to live in the
defendant's apartment building was repeatedly rejected, even though she was
"qualified" to live there."' The court defined this as meeting the legitimate
objective requirements of the landlord." 0 On the basis of this evidence, the
Eighth Circuit decided that a prima facie case of housing discrimination had
been established under the McDonnell Douglas standards,"17 and it went on to
hold that the defendant's excuse of nonavailability was not credible and there307 See 558 F.2d at 1295 n.16;'Comment supra note 119, at 157-58.
308 See text accompanying notes 94 to 102 supra. When the issue in a fair housing case is
the defendant's intent, there has been some dispute over the question of how much of a role
race must play in the defendant's decision before it can be held that sufficient racial intent has
been established. Compare Burris v. Wilkins, 544 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1977); 436 F.2d 344;
297 F. Supp. 151. See also 431 F. Supp. at 37. Cf. Note, supra note 254, at 772-77.
310 Id. at 802; see text accompanying notes 94 to 102 supra.
311 411 U.S. at 802.
312 Id. at. 803-04. With respect to this "pretext" issue, McDonnell Douglas,indicates that
particularly relevant evidence would be the employer's treatment of similarly situated white
applicants. Id. at 804. This type of proof would correspond to the tester's experience in a
fair housing case. Another "helpful" source of evidence on this point would be racial statistics
concerning the defendant's work force to demonstrate its "general policy and practice with
respect to minority employment" (id. at 804-05 & n.19), although the Court cautioned that
such statistical evidence should not be "controlling as to an individual hiring decision." Id. at
805 n.19.
313 499 F.2d 819 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
314 536 F.2d 231 (8th Cir. 1976).
315 Id. at 234.
316 Id. at 233.
317 Id. at 234-35.
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fore failed to rebut the inference of discrimination.318 The court also cited that
portion of the McDonnell Douglas opinion indicating that statistical proof should
not control an individual discrimination case in concluding that the defendant's
evidence of prior rentals to blacks did not rebut the plaintiff's prima facie
3 19

case.

Like Grooms and Real Estate Development, Williams and Anchor Building
are disparate treatment cases where the court nevertheless felt compelled to announce that Title VIII proscribes practices which "result in racial discrimination" and the "[e]ffect, not motivation, is the touchstone because a thoughtless
housing practice can be as unfair to minority rights as a willful scheme." 2 ' The
court in these two cases also relied on Griggs in rejecting the defendant's claims
of "business necessity." 32' Ironically, the Eighth Circuit was giving the defendants more than their due here, because "business necessity" is simply not a
defense in a disparate treatment case where racial intent is shown. What the
Eighth Circuit has done is to mix together the effect and purpose theories of
racial discrimination represented, respectively, by Griggsand McDonnellDouglas.
Under the former, proof that a facially neutral practice has a disproportionate
racial impact makes out a prima facie case that may be rebutted by a showing
of business necessity; when the defendant's racial purpose is established, however,
business necessity is not a defense. 2
One source of the confusion is that the plaintiff may pursue both theories in
the alternative in the same case. As McDonnell Douglas indicates, a statistical
showing that the defendant's practices exclude substantially more blacks than
whites not only establishes their disproportionate impact, but may also help to
prove discriminatory intent as well.32 In any given case, the plaintiff could, and
no doubt should, argue that the evidence is sufficient to establish racial purpose,
but failing this, that at least it makes out an effect case calling for a business
necessity rebuttal. Indeed, perhaps the most important use of Griggs to date in
fair housing cases has been as a "backup" position for a plaintiff who is really
trying to establish discriminatory intent. 4
The mandate of Griggs in a disparate treatment case of housing discrimination might also require that the "legitimate excuse" offered by the defendant
for rejecting the plaintiff be tested by the standards of the business necessity
defense; that is, the burden should be on the defendant to show that maintaining
the requirement that excluded the plaintiff is in fact necessary to a successful
business operation. This is the sense that the Eighth Circuit used Griggs in
Williams and Anchor Building. The defendant in Anchor Building had argued
that its high occupancy rate justified the rather disorganized and arbitrary selection procedures that resulted in rejecting a qualified applicant like Mrs. Smith.
The court held this excuse inadequate, citing Griggs for the proposition that
318
319
320
321
322
323
324

Id. at 235-36.
Id. at 235 n.7. Cf. Madison v. Jeffers, 494 F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1973).
536 F.2d. at 233; 499 F.2d at 826, 828.
536 F.2d at 235-36; 499 F.2d at 828.
See 431 F. Supp. at 37; Note, supra note 238, at 1272 n.26.
411 U.S. at 804-05 & n.19; see note 312 supra.
See, e.g., cases cited at note 277 supra.
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"an arbitrary and unnecessary housing practice must be removed where it op-

erates to discriminate" against blacks.325 Similarly, the Williams court rejected
a developer's claim that its reason for not dealing with a prospective black home
buyer was that it sold lots only to building companies, not to the general public. 26
There was strong evidence that this policy had not prevented sales to white
buyers and was merely a pretext. 7 Even if the practice had been applied evenhandedly, however, the court held that it could not overcome the plaintiffs prima
facie case of racial discrimination, because the defendant had failed to demonstrate "the absence of any acceptable alternative that will accomplish the same
business goal [of maintaining the quality of the homes in the development] with
less discrimination. 3 2 8
B. Statistical Proof of Discriminatory Effect in Fair Housing Cases
1. Minority Underrepresentation
Griggs may also be used in fair housing cases to help evaluate statistical
evidence of racial discrimination. In some of the cases, like Grooms, Real
Estate Development, and Williams, the defendants have never dealt with blacks,
much as Duke Power had never permitted a black to have an operational job
in Griggs. As courts in a number of Title VIII cases have remarked when presented with such statistical evidence, "nothing is as emphatic as zero."2
Of
course, just how "emphatic" the absence of any black residents is depends on
whether there are any blacks in the area. No blacks in a small apartment building in Montana may prove nothing at all about the landlord's racial policies. 30
Where there are substantial numbers of blacks in the market, however, proof
that none of them has ever lived in the defendant's building many constitute, as
the court held in Real Estate Development, at least "a prima facie case of racial
discrimination, casting a burden upon the defendant to come forward with
evidence to the contrary." 331
The courts that have noted the probative value of the absence of minorities
from the defendant's building have in essence adopted the "minority underrepresentation" approach to statistical proof of racial discrimination, which the
Supreme Court recently endorsed in Title VII cases. 32 The significance of this
325
326

536 F.2d at 235-36.
499 F.2d at 828.

327

Id. at 828 n.10.

328 Id. at 828. See also 431 F. Supp. at 37: "Objective criteria cannot have the effect of
excluding blacks from housing unless the criteria are demonstrably a reasonable measure of the
applicants' ability to be a 'successful tenant.' " The court in Bishop defined a "successful
tenant" as "one who stays for the period of the lease, pays his rent timely, and complies with
all other provisions of the lease." Id. at 37 n.5.
329 E.g., 499 F.2d at 827; 347 F. Supp. 782 (quoting United States v. Hinds County School
Bd., 417 F.2d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1032 (1970)).
330 See Bogen & Falcon, The Use of Racial Statistics in FairHousing Cases, 34 MD. L. REV.
59, 70 (1974).
331 347 F. Supp. at 782.
332 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Hazelwood School
Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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approach is that it permits the inference of discrimination not only in cases
where minorities have been totally excluded, but also in those cases where
minorities are simply underrepresented. Thus, in a fair housing suit, a showing
that the percentage of blacks in the defendant's housing is substantially lower
than the percentage of blacks in the local pool of applicants for such housing
may be a "telltale sign" of discrimination. 3
Defining the appropriate local market for purposes of this comparison may
well involve some difficult problems. The plaintiff might suggest that the racial
composition of the entire population of the area should be considered, while the
defendant is likely to argue for a narrower pool made up of only actual applicants or at least limited to those in the area who are able to meet his financial
standards. The employment discrimination cases provide some guidance. Under
Title VII, the Supreme Court has suggested that the entire population may be
used for purposes of comparison if no special skill is required for the job in
question, but that if the job demands particular qualifications, the proper comparison is with only those in the local labor market who have these qualifications." 4 Since meeting the financial requirements for a particular apartment or
housing development would seem to correspond to these special qualifications,
the proper comparison in a fair housing case would be with the pool of economically qualified applicants in the local market. Since the racial makeup of this
group might be difficult to establish, the issue of which party has the burden of
proof on this matter is important. The employment cases suggest that the
plaintiff should be able to make out a prima facie case of discrimination through
a general population comparison and that the burden should then be on the
defendant to show that the more appropriate comparison with the "qualified"
segment of the population would rebut the inference of discrimination." 5
Furthermore, the Title VII cases also suggest that the plaintiff in a fair
housing case need not show that other blacks have actually applied to the defendant. The Supreme Court has held that because of the process of self-selection,
a comparison using actual applicants might not be as accurate a measure of
employment discrimination as one involving all of the qualified persons in the
area. "The applicant process might itself not adequately reflect the actual
potential applicant pool, since otherwise qualified people might be discouraged
from applying because of a self-recognized inability to meet the very standards
challenged as being discriminatory." '3 6 Ironically, the self-selection process has
often been raised by defendants in Title VIII cases to claim that minority underrepresentation in their housing is not a matter of discrimination, but simply
reflects personal preferences of blacks who would rather live near members of
their own race. Whatever strength there may be in this argument 3 7 would seem
to be counterbalanced by the Supreme Court's recognition that the self-selection
333 See 431 U.S. at 339 n.20.
334 See Shoben, supra note 96, at 12-13 (comparing 431 U.S. 324 and 433 U.S. 299).
335 See Shoben, supra note 96, at 19.
336 Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
337 "The direct effects of housing discrimination appear to be a more significant cause of
segregation than factors such as income and personal preferences." Comment, supra: note 119,
at 130-31. See also id. at 131 n.18.
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process also may discourage blacks from applying because of the inhibiting factor
of possible discrimination. However the self-selection process works, it is as true
in housing as it is in employment that nondiscriminatory practices will ordinarily
be expected to result in time in an apartment complex or housing development
that is more or less representative of the racial composition of the local market
of qualified potential applicants."'
A number of trial courts in fair housing cases, including the one whose
decision was reversed by the Eighth Circuit in Anchor Building, have been unduly impressed with the fact that the defendant has dealt with other blacks in the
past.3 Apparently, these courts feel that this evidence shows that the defendant
operates on a nondiscriminatory basis and therefore could not have discriminated
against the plaintiff. As the Supreme Court's recent employment discrimination
cases demonstrate, however, a defendant can be guilty of discrimination, even
purposeful discrimination, without rejecting all minority applicants. Obviously
it is possible for blacks to become tenants of a landlord who judges their applications by more rigid standards than he applies to white applicants. Presumably, there would have been even more blacks applying for and living in the
apartment complex in Anchor Building, for example, if it weren't for the difficult
application procedures the defendant required of blacks -0 Some defendants
may even rent to a few especially well-qualified minorities in order to avoid the
appearance of discrimination. In addition, "racial steering," the practice of
allowing blacks to secure housing in some areas but not in others, clearly violates
Title VIII,34 ' even though ira such a case the defendant by definition has made
some housing available to blacks. 4 In short, the fact that a defendant can
show that he has rented or sold homes to some blacks other than the plaintiff
should not be a defense to a Title VIII suit.
Of course, a showing by the defendant that blacks generally have not applied may be relevant,343 and the defendant's building need not precisely mirror
the racial make-up of the area. 44 The point is only that if a substantially higher
proportion of blacks are in the potential applicant pool than are living in the
defendant's building, an inference arises that some factor other than chance, such
as racial discrimination, is at work in the selection process. Thus, even though
338 Cf. 433 U.S. at 326 (quoting 431 U.S. at 339 n.20).
339 See, e.g., Johnson v. Albritton, 424 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. La. 1977); Drain v. Friedman, 422 F. Supp. 366 (N.D. Ohio 1976); 397 F. Supp. at 259; Stroessel v. Parkside Development Co., 358 F.Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also 494 F.2d 114; 509 F.2d 1110.
340 536 F.2d at 233-36
341 E.g., Moore v. Townsend, 525 F.2d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Real
Estate One, 433 F. Supp. 1140 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Wheatley Heights Neighborhood Coalition
v. Jenna Resales Co., 429 F. Supp. 486 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); Fair Housing Council of Bergen
County, Inc. v. Eastern Bergen County Multiple Listing Service, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 1071,
1074-76 (D.N.J. 1976); 401 F. Supp. 399; Zuch v. Hussey, 366 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Mich.
1973), 394 F. Supp. 1028, aff'd, 547 F.2d 1168 (6th Cir. 1976). See also Village of Bellwood
v. Gladstone Realtors, 569 F.2d 1013 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S.Ct. 3068 (1978).
342 See, e.g., United States v. Pelzer Realty Co., 484 F.2d 438, 441 (5th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974), where the defendant refused to allow blacks to buy in his new
development but offered them homes in another area instead. See also, 485 F.2d 528.
343 Cf. 433 U.S. at 237 n.13.
344 Cf. Shoben, supra note 96, at 39.
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"nothing is as emphatic as zero," a prinua facie case under Title VIII can also
be made out against a defendant who has rented or sold to a disproportionately
low number of minorities, thereby shifting the burden to him to show that his
selection procedures are required by business necessity.
2. Disparate Impact
While a showing of minority underrepresentation has often helped to prove
racial discrimination in fair housing cases, it is rare to find a Title VIII suit that
is based on proof of the other type of discriminatory effect-that the defendant's
selection standards have a disparate impact on blacks. Disparate impact was
the basis of the Supreme Court's decision to strike down the diploma and testing
requirements in Griggs, and it was used as a method of showing discriminatory
effect in employment cases long before the Court endorsed the minority underrepresentation approach. In the housing field, however, the classic Griggs case of
attacking a facially neutral practice solely on the ground that it disproportionately excludes blacks is unusual.
To date, the closest thing to a "pure" Griggs claim in a fair housing case
has been Boyd v. Lefrak Organization,45 where the Second Circuit in a 2-1
decision refused to apply Griggs to a Title VIII-§ 1982 suit. Boyd involved a
challenge to the defendant's practice of requiring that applicants for its apartments have a weekly net income equal to at least 90% of the monthly rent of the
unit desired."' For example, an apartment renting for $300 a month would not
be leased to anyone whose net income (gross income minus taxes, fixed obligation, and debts) was below $270 per week, or about $14,000 annually.
The suit was a class action for injunctive relief brought on behalf of New
York City welfare recipients, who claimed that the 90% Rule prevented them
from renting any of Lefrak's 15,484 apartments in the city. The defendant's
financial standard was not shown to be racially motivated. On the contrary, its
origins could be traced to a consent decree obtained in an earlier housing discrimination case brought by the Attorney General against Lefrak,341 with the
90% Rule apparently designed to insure that Lefrak would follow objective,
economic, nonracial criteria in passing on its apartment applicants. Nor were
minorities substantially underrepresented in Lefrak's apartments, since 19.8% of
its tenants were black and the population of New York City was only 21%
black."' Nevertheless, plaintiffs claimed that the impact of the defendant's
90% Rule was racially discriminatory in violation of Title VIII and § 1982,
because it excluded practically all welfare recipients, at least 77% of whom were
minorities, and because the percentage of blacks disqualified by the rule was
substantially higher than the percentage of whites that failed to satisfy it. 49
In rejecting this claim, the majority opinion in Boyd first decided that this
345
346

come
347
348
349

509 F.2d 1110 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975).
Alternatively, an applicant could obtain a co-signer for the lease whose weekly net in-

was at least 110% of the monthly rent. Id. at 1111.
See id. at 1112. See also Boyd v. United States, 345 F. Supp. 790 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
509 F.2d at 1113.
Id. at 1117-18 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
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was a case of economic, rather than racial, discrimination. 5 The court held
that under the Supreme Court's decision in James v. Valtierra,35 ' discrimination
against the poor was not necessarily to be considered discrimination on the basis
of race, even though minorities were disproportionately represented among lowincome people." 2 This statement correctly reflects the Supreme Court's position
in Valtierraand other equal protection cases,35 but the Second Circuit's opinion
in Boyd failed to realize that the analysis of these equal protection claims was
based on a less rigorous standard than might be appropriate under a congressional
statute, as Davis and Arlington Heights were to suggest later. Indeed, the Boyd
opinion indicated that a disproportionate effect standard was applicable in an
equal protection claim challenging government action,354 a conclusion ultimately
rejected by the Supreme Court in Davis, but it felt that "such an analysis is inappropriate in the context of a purely private action asserting racial discrimination" against a businessman. 5 Thus, Boyd drew a distinction between the
proper standards for public and private defendants under Title VIII, a distinction that is not supported by anything in the language of the statute and that
seems directly at odds with the rationale of Griggs. With respect to Griggs, the
Second Circuit decided that its analysis should not be extended beyond the
employment field 5 . and held that neither Title VIII nor § 1982 prohibited a
private landlord from discriminating against low-income tenants "absent evidence
that his motivation is racial." '57
As a precedent, Boyd is weakened substantially by its indiscriminate mixing
of the equal protection and statutory standards, by its unsupported distinction
between public and private defendants, and by its rather cavalier treatment of
the argument that Griggs should apply to claims under the fair housing laws.
The important question, however, is not whether Boyd's analysis is faulty, but
whether the ultimate result reached by the court is correct. Surely, there is
nothing wrong with the majority's conclusion that a landlord "may seek assurance that prospective tenants will be able to meet their rental responsibilities." 358
An applicant's financial background and ability to pay are obviously related to
the legitimate business interests of a landlord, housing developer, or lending
institution. Indeed, the legislative history of Title VIII affirmatively shows that
it was not designed to guarantee housing to those unable to afford it. 59 The
Fair Housing Act does not command that any person must be accepted simply
because he is a member of a minority group. 6
350 Id. at 1112-13.
351 402 U.S. 137 (1971).
352 509 F.2d at 1113.
353 See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
see also 429 U.S. at 259.
354 509 F.2d at 1113 (citing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969)).
355 Id.
356 Id. at 1114.
357 Id. at 1113; see also id. at 1115.
358 Id. at 1114. Judge Mansfield's dissent in Boyd agreed. See id. at 1116 (Mansfield, J.,
dissenting). See also notes 39 & 287 supra.
359 See, e.g., 114 CONG. REQ. 3421 (1968) (remarks of Sen. Mondale).
360 Cf. 401 U.S. at 430-31. Thus, a landlord is certainly free under Title VIII to pick a
white applicant over a black applicant if the white is better qualified on the basis of legitimate
rental criteria.
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Important as ability to pay is in selecting a tenant, however, it is no more
important than a job applicant's ability and intelligence would be to a prospective
employer. Griggs, therefore, is instructive on this point. As the Chief Justice
wrote there:
Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring procedures;
obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is giving these
devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a
reasonable measure of job performance. Congress has not commanded that
the less qualified be preferred over the better qualified simply because of
minority origins. Far from disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress
has made such qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion,
nationality, and sex become irrelevant. What Congress has commanded is
that any tests used
must measure the person for the job and not the person
3G
in the abstract. '
The same statement could be made about financial qualifications under the Fair
Housing Act.
Under Griggs, a showing that an employment test has a disproportionate
racial impact does not invalidate it, but only shifts the burden to the employer to
show that the test is related to the job in question. Similarly, the defendant in
Boyd should have been required to show that its 90% Rule was necessary to
insure that its tenants would pay the rent. As a matter of fact, the evidence
indicated rather clearly that many people who could not meet the 90% Rule
were nevertheless successful tenants. As Judge Mansfield pointed out in dissent,
more than half of all New York City households renting apartments in the
Lefrak rental range had net incomes of less than 90% of their monthly rents,
and there was no showing that landlords renting to these tenants had suffered
financially. 62 Furthermore, the plaintiffs' ability to meet their rental obligations
was perhaps better than that of other tenants with comparable incomes who were
not on welfare, because welfare recipients also receive noncash benefits such as
food stamps and because their rent might be paid by a government agency if
they default. 63 In short, the plaintiffs'-incomes did not properly measure their
ability to pay rent to Lefrak.
By way of response, Lefrak might well have argued that the 90% Rule was
at least rationally related to ability to pay in a general sense, since most people
whose incomes satisfied the rule were better able to pay than most people whose
incomes did not, and that the rule could be justified as being less costly than a
system of evaluating each applicant's ability to pay on an individual basis.
Reasonable as this argument may sound, similar defenses for discriminatory
employment practices have been rejected under Title VII. For one thing, civil
rights statutes require that an individual be judged on his own merits, not on
the basis of group stereotypes. In a recent Title VII case, the Supreme Court
361
362
363

401 U.S. at 436.
509 F.2d at 1118 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
Id.
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stated that "[e]ven a true generalization about the class is an insufficient reason
for disqualifying an individual to whom the generalization does not apply." 6 '
Furthermore, the Court has made clear that Title VII requires more than a
"rational basis" to defend an employment practice that disqualifies a substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks. 65 The courts have also held that
the business necessity defense requires that there be no reasonable alternative to
the challenged practice that would serve the same interests and result in less
discrimination.6 ' As noted previously, when the only relief sought is an injunction against the challenged practices, it does not seem unreasonable for Title
VII to require a businessman to give up an unjustified practice that hurts racial
minorities.
This is not to say that Lefrak necessarily should have lost in Boyd. For one
thing, the fact that the defendant's 90% Rule apparently resulted from an
agreement with the Attorney General in a prior fair housing suit suggests that
the rule has some legitimacy as a nondiscriminatory standard, at least in the
peculiar circumstances of this case. Secondly, the fact that Lefrak's overall
rental practices resulted in accepting blacks in about the same proportion as they
bore to the total population of New York City distinguishes Boyd from all other
Title VIII cases in which statistical evidence has been used to prove discrimination. Indeed, even under Title VII, some courts have been reluctant to find
discrimination on the basis of the disproportionate impact of one requirement
when the defendant's overall selection process results in a work force with a large
percentage of blacks.3"7 Of course, the result of permitting a landlord to use even
one unjustified discriminatory selection device is that he will rent to fewer minorities than he otherwise would have. This, is true, as Judge Mansfield's dissent in
Boyd pointed out, " ' whether the defendant has rented to other blacks or not.
Still, the unique circumstances of Boyd make it impossible to say for certain that
the Second Circuit erred in ruling for Lefrak.
What is clearly wrong about Boyd, however, is its facile determinations that
Griggs has no application to fair housing cases and that a landlord need not
justify his use of income-related or other facially neutral selection criteria, even
when those criteria have the effect of discriminating against minorities. At least
where the racial composition of the defendant's tenants compares unfavorably
with the racial makeup of the surrounding community, Title VIII should require that any housing requirement that affects blacks more severely than whites
must be justified by business necessity. When the evidence of business necessity
is as weak as it was in Boyd, even income-related criteria should be enjoined.
Such criteria may be useful, but Title VIII forbids "giving these devices and
mechanisms controlling force unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure"
of one's ability to rent or purchase housing.36 9
364 98 S.Ct. at 1375.
365 See 426 U.S. at 246-47.
366 See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
367 See, e.g., Smith v. Troyan, 520 F.2d 492, 497-98 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 934 (1976). But see Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1373 (5th
Cir. 1974). See generally Shoben, supra note 96, at 25-32; Lopatka, supra note 100, at 79-81.
368 509 F.2d at 1118 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).
369 See 401 U.S. at 436.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[December 1978]

C. DiscriminatoryEffect in Exclusionary Zoning
Cases Under the Fair Housing Act
1. Evolving Standards in Exclusionary Zoning Cases
Boyd is one of the few cases in which a housing practice of a private defendant has been challenged under the fair housing laws simply on the basis of
its disproportionate impact on blacks. On the other hand, the effect theory of
housing discrimination has often been raised in suits against local governments
in which the defendant's zoning or other land use decisions are alleged to have
excluded racial minorities. These suits generally claim that both racial purpose
and racial effect are involved in the defendant's decision, but since proving that
a public body acted for illicit reasons is difficult, the "fall back" theory of discriminatory effect is commonly reached. Most of the courts of appeal have
decided at least one of these cases under the Fair Housing Act, and their interpretations of the requirements of Title VIII in such cases have varied substantially. The different approaches are illustrated by five cases: Kennedy Park
Homes Ass'n. v. City of Lackawanna;7 ° United States v. City of Black Jack;371
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights;372 Joseph
74
Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo; 3- and Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo.1
Lackawanna is the earliest of these cases, and it reflects the attitude shared
by many before Washington v. Davis that the equal protection and statutory
standards for judging a claim of official racial discrimination were identical. 75
In Lackawanna, the city prevented development of a low income housing project
in one of its white neighborhoods by rezoning the intended site for a park and
recreation area. The district court found that "[t]he history of Lackawanna is
that of a racially separate community," 76 and it held that by blocking private
efforts to integrate the area, the city had denied plaintiffs "equal housing ops77
portunity" in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title VIII.
The Second Circuit affirmed.178 The court concluded that "racial motivation resulting in invidious discrimination guided the actions of the City,"37 but
it also stated that these actions should be assessed not only by their "immediate
objective," but also by their "historical context and ultimate effect." 8 6 The
370 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
371 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
372 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) and 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
373 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977) and 558
F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1977).
374 564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978). Other cases raising
similar issues include United Farm Workers of Florida Housing Project v. City of Delray
Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d 1037 (10th Cir.
1970); SASSO v. City of Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Crow v. Brown, 332 F.
Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), aff'd, 457 F.2d 788 '(5th Cir. 1972).
375 See cases cited at 426 U.S. at 244-45 n.12; 558 F.2d at 1286 n.2, 1287; 564 F.2d at 146.
376 318 F. Supp. at 694.
377 Id. at 695.
378 436 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971).
379 Id. at 109.
380 Id. at 112.
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Second Circuit's opinion relied exclusively on equal protection precedents, and its
analysis did not distinguish between the equal protection claim and the Title
VIII claim. Having determined that "[t]he effect of Lackawanna's action was
inescapably adverse" to the plaintiffs' right to use their property free from official
discrimination, the court proceeded to judge Lackawanna's justification for its
action by the equal protection standard of whether it served a compelling governmental interest."' The city's claims that it needed more park space and that
the proposed development would worsen its sewer problems were considered
neither convincing nor compelling." 2
United States v. City of Black Jack..'is unique among the early exclusionary
zoning cases, because it was a Title VIII suit brought by the Attorney General,
and, therefore, no claim under the Equal Protection Clause was involved. In
Black Jack, the Eighth Circuit struck down a zoning ordinance that prevented
construction of a subsidized, integrated housing development in an all-white community near St. Louis, despite a finding below that Black Jack had not acted out
of racial motives. Although there was substantial evidence of discriminatory
purpose, the court explicitly refused to base its holding on this evidence." 4
Rather, it cited a number of equal protection and Title VIII cases to support iti,
conclusion that
the plaintiff need prove no more than that the conduct of the defendant
actually or predictably results in racial discrimination; in other words, that it
has a discriminatory effect. The plaintiff need make no showing whatsoever that the action resulting in racial discrimination in housing was racially
motivated. Effect, and not motivation, is the touchstone .... 3 85
The Eighth Circuit went on to determine that the city's action in blocking the
development did have a discriminatory effect and that its claimed justifications
for that action-controlling traffic, preventing overcrowded schools, and maintaining property values-were inadequate to meet its "compelling governmental
interest" burden.
The fact that Title VIII was the only basis for relief in Black Jack became
particularly important after the Supreme Court decided Davis and Arlington
Heights, because Black Jack was not affected as a precedent by their holding
that equal protection claims required proof of purposeful discrimination. Even
though the Eighth Circuit relied on equal protection standards and precedents,
including Lackawanna, in its analysis of the Black Jack case, its decision was
based exclusively on Title VIII. It is, in fact, the first appellate decision to find
a Title VIII violation on the basis of discriminatory effect alone.
In Arlington Heights,' which was reviewed above, the Seventh Circuit
accepted the trial court's finding that the defendants were not motivated by
racial considerations, but it held that the showing of discriminatory effect was
381 Id. at 114 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)).
382 Id. at 111, 114.
383 508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
384 Id. at 1185 n.3.
385 Id. at 1184-85 (citations omitted).
386 517 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 429 U.S. 252 (1977) and 558 F.2d 1283 (7th
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978).
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sufficient under the Equal Protection Clause to require the defendants to show a
compelling governmental interest for their actions. After the Supreme Court
"corrected" this view, the Seventh Circuit on remand was faced with the task of
deciding whether Title VIII could prohibit conduct that did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause. The court of appeals held that it could "at least
under some circumstances" 8 and that it did "under the circumstances of this
388
case.1
The Seventh Circuit recognized, as Griggs had, that not all practices with
discriminatory effects are illegal." 9 Rather than following the Griggs approach
of using discriminatory effect to shift the burden of justification to the defendant,
however, the appellate court in Arlington Heights identified four "critical factors"
that it considered relevant to a determination of liability under Title VIII. They
were:
(1) how strong is the plaintiff's showing of discriminatory effect; (2) is
there some evidence of discriminatory intent, though not enough to satisfy
the constitutional standard of Washington v. Davis; (3) what is the defendant's interest in taking the action complained of; and (4) does the plaintiff
seek to compel the defendant to affirmatively provide housing for members of
minority groups or merely to restrain the defendant from interfering with
individual property owners who seek to provide such housing.3 90
Applying these factors, the court held that the strength of the plaintiff's
showing of discriminatory effect depended on whether there were alternative
sites available for the proposed development in Arlington Heights. A further
hearing by the trial court was ordered on this question, with the defendants
having the burden of proving that a suitable alternative parcel could be used.3 '
The opinion did decide that if no other land were available, the Village's
decision to block the development on the site proposed by the plaintiffs would
foreclose the possibility of ending residential segregation in Arlington Heights. 92
This strong discriminatory effect would violate Title VIII, the Seventh Circuit
held, because it outweighed the defendants' lack of discriminatory intent (factor
2) and the fact that the Village was acting pursuant to its legitimate zoning
authority (factor 3)."' In considering the fourth factor-the nature of the
relief sought-the court took note of a line of Second Circuit cases that distinguished between actions such as Lackawanna that sought to prevent official
interference with private efforts to build integrated developments and those

387 558 F.2d at 1290.
388 Id. at 1285.
389 Id. at 1290.
390 Id.
391 Id. at 1295. Chief Judge Fairchild dissented on this point only, arguing that the plaintiffs should have the burden of proof on this issue. Id. at 1295-96 (Fairchild, C. J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).

392
393

Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1293-94.
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demanding that local governments themselves build such housing." 4 Since the
Arlington Heights plaintiffs only sought to enjoin the Village from obstructing
their own private development, the Seventh Circuit concluded that factor 4
favored the plaintiffs."'5
Joseph Skillken & Co. v. City of Toledo390 demonstrates that not all of the
courts of appeals are receptive to exclusionary zoning suits. Indeed, the Sixth
Circuit's opinion, which upheld Toledo's decision to block a subsidized development in an affluent, all-white neighborhood, often sounds more exclusionary
than the most conservative suburban zoning official. It states that low cost public
housing does "not belong" in exclusive neighborhoods, "where the property
owners, relying on the zoning laws, have spent large sums of money to build
fine homes for the enjoyment of their families."39 This emphasis on the economic interests of the local residents also led the Sixth Circuit to conclude that
granting the injunction sought by the plaintiffs would mean that "[i]nnocent
people who labored hard all of their lives and saved their money to purchase
homes in nice residential neighborhoods, and who never discriminated against
anyone, would be faced with a total change in their neighborhoods, with the
'
values of their properties slashed."398
As in Lackawanna and Arlington Heights, the plaintiffs' claim in Skillken
was based on the Equal Protection Clause and the fair housing laws. Another
similarity with those cases was that Skillken was decided by the trial court and
the Sixth Circuit before Washington v. Davis was handed down, and neither
court made any distinction between the constitutional and statutory standards for
judging this type of claim. The district court, which ruled for the plaintiffs, had
initially decided that Toledo's refusal to permit the development was racially
motivated, but ultimately it based its decision not on the defendants' motivation,
but on the fact that their action would have a racially discriminatory effect and
would perpetuate residential segregation in Toledo. 99 The Sixth Circuit concluded that the court below erred in finding official discrimination, 40 0 but its
opinion does not make clear whether it also disagreed with the trial court's finding of discriminatory effect. In any event, the court of appeals held that a
neutral policy was not invalid just because it had a greater impact on minorities,
and it refused to subject Toledo's justifications for its zoning decision to the
compelling interest test.4 ° '
The plaintiffs then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
The Court, after deciding Arlington Heights, vacated the Sixth Circuit's decision
in Skiliken and remanded the case for consideration in light of its Arlington
394 Id. at 1293. "The Fair Housing Act does not impose any duty upon a governmental
body to construct or to 'plan for, approve or promote' any housing." Acevedo v. Nassau
County, 500 F.2d 1078, 1082 (2d Cir. 1974).
395 558 F.2d at 1293.
396 528 F.2d 867 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 1068 (1977) and 558
F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1978).
397 528 F.2d at 881.
398 Id.
399 See id. at 872.
400 Id. at 879.
401 Id.
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Heights opinion." 2 In a brief per curiam opinion," 3 the Sixth Circuit on remand
adhered to its previous decision, which it felt was supported by Arlington
Heights. The remand opinion, like the earlier appellate decision, did not discuss
Title VIII at all. Nevertheless, Skillken must be considered as a statement of the
Sixth Circuit's belief that the Fair Housing Act is to be construed according to
the same purposeful discrimination standard that now governs equal protection
claims." 4
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo"°5 is the first new exclusionary zoning case
to reach a federal appellate court since the Supreme Court decided Arlington
Heights. Once again, this litigation involved an effort by local municipal
officials, this time in Philadelphia, to prevent construction of a low income
housing project in a virtually all-white neighborhood. The Third Circuit held
that the City's housing and redevelopment authorities, though not shown to have
purposefully discriminated, nevertheless violated Title VIII, because their "acts
had a discriminatory effect and . . .the agencies have failed to justify the discriminatory results of their actions." '
In addition, the court determined that
the City of Philadelphia, which was also a defendant, had engaged in purposeful
discrimination in violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The court of
appeals concluded by affirming the district court's order and thereby mandating
the construction of the project and enjoining the governmental defendants from
interfering with it.
The Rizzo opinion not only applied a more rigorous standard under Title
VIII than it did with respect to the constitutional claim, it also explained why
Title VIII had been given relatively little attention in exclusionary zoning cases:
Until relatively recently, federal courts were not often called upon to
adjudicate Title VIII claims. We attribute this circumstance to our impression that, at least with respect to alleged discrimination in housing by
governmental agencies, the inquiry into claimed equal protection violations
has made unnecessary a separate consideration of the "coextensive" rights
and remedies afforded by Title VIII. However, given the increased burden
of proof which Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights now place upon
equal. protection claimants, we suspect that Title VIII will undoubtedly
appear as a more attractive route to nondiscriminatory housing, as litigants
become increasingly aware that Title VIII rights may be enforced even
without direct evidence of discriminatory intent. We conclude that, in Title
VIII cases, by analogy to Title VII cases, unrebutted 40proof
of discriminatory
7
effect alone may justify a federal equitable response.
Thus, the Third Circuit interpreted Title VIII in a manner similar to the Eighth
Circuit's interpretation in Black Jack and to the Seventh Circuit's decision on
remand in Arlington Heights, but in conflict with the remand decision of the
Sixth Circuit in Skillken.
402
403
404
405
406

429 U.S. 1068.
558 F.2d 350 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 985 (1978).
But see 429 F. Supp. 1379.
564 F.2d 126 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 908 (1978).
Id. at 146.

407

Id.
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2. Proving Discriminatory Effect in Exclusionary Zoning Cases
The evidence used to prove discriminatory effect in these exclusionary
zoning cases differs somewhat from the evidence relied on in Title VIII effect
cases against private defendants. Since the municipal defendant in an exclusionary zoning suit is generally not a housing provider, the focus is not on whether
minorities are underrepresented in the buildings it operates. Instead, the key
element in these cases is minority underrepresentation in the housing in the
vicinity of the proposed development as compared with the racial makeup of
the overall metropolitan area. In Arlington Heights, for example, the Seventh
Circuit observed that "Arlington Heights remains almost totally white in a
metropolitan area with a significant percentage of black people."4 ° Indeed, the
defendants' community was the most residentially segregated of all Chicago-area
municipalities with over 50,000 residents.0 9 The other exclusionary zoning cases
also involved sites in virtually all-white communities that were located in metropolitan areas with substantial minority populations.
The municipal defendants in these 'cases often argued that this type of
minority underrepresentation could not be used to establish their discrimination,
because they had no control over who resided in their communities. 10 It is one
thing to claim that the absence of minorities in a landlord's building indicates
that he has discriminated, but quite another to contend that an all white town
means that its officials have violated Title VIII. Since these defendants were not
responsible for choosing which people lived within their jurisdiction, they claimed
that comparing the percentage of minorities in the area of the proposed development to the percentage of minorities in the overall metropolitan region
proved nothing at all about whether their reaction to the particular development
under consideration was discriminatory.
This argument, however, misses the point of these suits. Apart from
whether local governments can fairly claim that they have no influence on the
racial composition of their community's residents,4 1' the issue in exclusionary
zoning cases is not so much who caused segregated housing patterns to develop,
but rather what is to be done about them now. The legislative history of Title
VIII shows that Congress intended for the law to promote "open, integrated residential patterns and to prevent the increase of segregation .... ,"' Thus, when
a municipality blocks construction of an integrated development in an all-white
area and its action has the effect of perpetuating residential segregation, a prima
facie violation of the Fair Housing Act is established.
No Title VII precedent authorizes the type of minority underrepresentation
408 558 F.2d at 1288. According to the 1970 census, blacks made up less than 1% of
Arlington Heights' population (517 F.2d at 413-14), while they constituted 18% of the population of the greater metropolitan Chicago area (429 U.S. at 269). In an earlier, unrelated
case, the Supreme Court had determined that the relevant geographic area for purposes of
public housing in that market is the greater metropolitan Chicago area. See Hills v. Gautreaux,
425 U.S. 284, 299-300 (1976).
409 517 F.2d at 414 n.1.
410 See, e.g., 517 F.2d at 414; 528 F.2d at 879; cf. 564 F.2d at 130-33.
411 See 564 F.2d at 130-33.
412 Otero v. New York City Housing Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973).
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comparison used in exclusionary zoning cases, but then, these suits are not really
analogous to employment discrimination cases. Title VII does cover governmental defendants, but they are sued in their role as employers, not because they
prevented private companies from providing integrated job opportunities. The
special concerns of the Fair Housing Act, however, mean that it covers not only
discrimination in public housing, but also governmental interference with private
desegregation efforts, regardless of whether the segregation was originally caused
by the defendant or not.
In addition to this special showing of minority underrepresentation, all of
the successful exclusionary zoning suits also include proof that the municipality's
decision had a disparate impact on minorities. Since the challenged action
usually prevents construction of a subsidized housing development, the group
adversely affected by that decision is made up of low-income people who are
eligible for such housing, and blacks generally account for a disproportionate
number of this group.413 The minority percentage of eligible low-income tenants
differs from case to case, but it is invariably higher than the percentage of
minorities in the overall metropolitan population. 14' The impact of the action
under review therefore falls disproportionately on those protected by Title VIII.
Thus, discriminatory effect in exclusionary zoning cases has been shown by
disproportionate impact as well as by minority underrepresentation. Of the two,
however, minority underrepresentation is the more significant factor. As long
as blacks make up a substantial proportion of those eligible for the proposed
housing, its development will significantly reduce segregation in an all-white area.
This is true even if more whites than blacks live in the development. As the
Seventh Circuit noted in Arlington Heights, the fact that nonwhites accounted
for 40% of eligible group of tenants for the 190 subsidized townhouses proposed
to be built by the plaintiffs meant that the project "might well result in increasing
'
Arlington Heights' minority population by over one thousand percent."415
In an
exclusionary zoning suit, the goal of the Fair Housing Act is to promote integrated housing, not just housing for minorities.
This is not to say that every predominantly white town in America must
accommodate low income housing. For one thing, developers are unlikely to
propose projects in affluent areas where the lack of jobs and other market factors
reduce the effective demand for subsidized housing. Even where a low income
development is proposed and then rejected by a local municipality, the discriminatory effect of that decision is not per se illegal under the Fair Housing Act.
If the defendant's action is necessary to advance legitimate zoning or other
municipal interests (i.e., if the business necessity defense is established), the
discriminatory effect alone of that action will not violate Title VIII.
3. The Defendant's Burden of Justification
Although Black Jack, Arlington Heights, and Rizzo agree that a showing of
413 See, e.g., 564 F.2d at 142 (minorities account for 95% of those eligible for the proposed
housing); 558 F.2d at 1291 (40%); cf. 528 F.2d at 878.
414 But see 528 F.2d at 878.
415 517 F.2d at 414.
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discriminatory effect may make out a prima facie case under Title VIII, they
differ among themselves in the standards they would apply to the defendant's
burden of justification. Black Jack had equated this burden with the compelling
state interest test that is triggered by a showing of purposeful discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. The Eighth Circuit's analysis is
understandable in terms of pre-Davis equal protection law, but it seems inappropriate today. If the correct analogy to a discriminatory effect case under the
Fair Housing Act is Griggs rather than the Equal Protection Clause, then the
defendant's burden should be something more akin to business necessity than the
more severe compelling interest test.
The analysis in Rizzo does employ the two-step Griggs approach of first
evaluating the racial effect of the defendants' practices and then considering their
justification. This analysis contrasts with the Seventh Circuit's approach in
Arlington Heights of identifying and weighing a variety of "critical factors" in
determining whether Title VIII has been violated. The difference in these two
methods of analyzing an effect case under Title VIII may not be particularly
significant in terms of producing different results. Indeed, the Rizzo opinion
sought to moderate whatever conflict there appeared to be by suggesting that
the two approaches required essentially the same type of showing to establish a
prima facie case of discriminatory effect. 41 The Third Circuit also noted that its
decision for the plaintiffs would have been the same even if it had applied the
four factors identified in Arlington Heights, and it expressed the belief that the
Seventh Circuit's approach simply set forth "a standard upon which ultimate
Title VIII relief may be predicated, rather than indicating the point at which the
evidentiary burden of justifying a discriminatory effect will shift to the defendant."41
To the extent that there is a real difference between Rizzo and Arlington
Heights, howeyer, the Third Circuit's approach is preferable. The two-step
analysis adopted in Rizzo has Griggs to recommend it and the seven years of
judicial experience under Griggs to guide it. Even if the Seventh Circuit's
analysis accurately identifies the relevant factors to be weighed,41 it fails to
explain how they are to be weighed, and it thus fails to provide adequate guidance to the trial judges, litigants, and future decision-makers who will have to
apply it. The proper structure for balancing these factors and for identifying
where the burden of proof lies has already been worked out under Title VII by
416 564 F.2d at 148 n.32.
417 Id.
418 There is some doubt on this score. For example, Arlington Heights' factor 2-whether
there is some evidence of discriminatory intent-is not relevant in a discriminatory effect case
under Griggs. There, the Supreme Court held that Title VII was violated even though "there
was no showing of a discriminatory purpose in the adoption of the diploma and test requirements." 401 U.S. at 428; see also id. at 432. It is true, as the Arlington Heights opinion
points out (558 F.2d at 1292), that some evidence of discriminatory intent was present in
Lackawanna, Black Jack, and many other Title VIII decisions that announced that the
Fair Housing Act was to be governed by an effect standard, but the fact that this element is
"discernible from previous cases" (558 F.2d at 1290) does not mean that it should be a
necessary part of a prima facie case under Title VIII. See note 96 supra. See also Comment,
A Last Stand on Arlington Heights: Title VIII and the Requirement of DiscriminatoryIntent,
53 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150 (1978).
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Griggs and its progeny, and Rizzo wisely decided to follow their lead.
The Rizzo opinion did recognize that the task of evaluating the defendant's
justifications in a fair housing case is not completely analogous to reviewing a
Title VII defendant's claim of business necessity. For example, the court noted
that "the job-related qualities which might legitimately bar a Title VII-protected
employee from employment will be much more susceptible to definition and
quantification than any attempted justification of discriminatory housing
practices under Title VIII."4 1' Thus, the commands of the Fair Housing Act
in discriminatory effect cases may be destined to be less predictable than they
are under Title VII. Rizza indicates that Title VIII criteria must emerge "on
a case-by-case basis,"4 ' echoing the Seventh Circuit's statements in Arlington
Heights that its decision there was based on the particular circumstances of that
1
case.

42

Nevertheless, these cases do provide some guidelines. In evaluating the
defendant's justifications, Rizzo accepted the relevance of the factors identified
in Arlington Heights42 and also concluded that "a justification must serve, in
theory and practice, a legitimate, bona fide interest of the Title VIII defendant,
and the defendant must show that no alternative course of action could be
adopted that would enable that interest to be served with less discriminatory
impact."4
This statement incorporates two elements of the Title VII business
necessity defense: (1) that the challenged practice must actually serve the
legitimate purpose claimed for it; and (2) that no alternative exists that would
accomplish the same purpose with a lesser racial impact.4 24
The Rizzo statement of the defendant's burden of justification under Title
VIII differs from its Title VII counterpart in that it does not speak in terms of
"business necessity." This may simply reflect the fact that Rizzo and other exclusionary zoning cases involve governmental defendants, whose legitimate
interests may not be limited to the business concerns of a private employer. The
Seventh Circuit's remand opinion in Arlington Heights even suggested that
courts might be more "solicitous" of governmental interests under the Fair
Housing Act compared with those of private defendants whose practices have
discriminatory effects.42 In any event, the actions of even public defendants
that cause discriminatory effects should be justifiable under Title VIII only
if they are necessary to accomplish the defendant's legitimate interests, whatever
those might be. "The defendant's burden in these instances should be to prove
that the challenged practice is reasonably necessary for the achievement of a
420
legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose."
419 564 F.2d at 148.
420 Id. at 149.
421 558 F.2d at 1285, 1290. See also 114 CONG. REC. 5216 (1968) (remarks of Sen.
Baker) (courts should decide what constitutes sufficient evidence on a case-by-case basis).
422 564 F.2d at 149 n.36. But see note 418 supra.
423 Id. at 149. "If the defendant does introduce evidence that no such alternative course
of action can be adopted, the burden will once again shift to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
other practices are available." Id. at 149 n.37.
424 See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
425 558 F.2d at 1293; cf. 509 F.2d at 1113; note 92 supra.
426 Note, supra note 238, at 1287.
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This standard would be appropriate for both public and private defendants
in discriminatory effect cases under the Fair Housing Act. As the exclusionary
zoning decisions demonstrate, municipal defendants can certainly be as creative
as private landlords in advancing "legitimate" justifications for their actions.
In Arlington Heights, for example, the Village attempted to justify its refusal to
grant the plaintiff's rezoning petition on the ground that the proposed development would undermine neighborhood property values and would be inconsistent
with the Village's plan to permit multiple-family housing only as a buffer between
single-family and commercial areas.42 The evidence established, however, that
the defendants had ignored this buffer policy in approving a number of other
rezoning petitions for developers of private, commercial apartment complexes."'
In addition, the development proposed by the plaintiffs called for two-story
townhouses that were more similar to the neighboring single-family homes than
to apartments. As the Seventh Circuit noted in its first decision, "[t]he planning
rationale behind the buffer zone policy has only minimal applicability to this type
of low-rise, open-space development."42 These considerations also meant that the
Village's fears that the development would greatly reduce neighboring property
values was not substantiated.
In short, Arlington Heights did not show that its decision was reasonably
necessary to advance its legitimate zoning interests. Obviously, a different conclusion might result if the proposed development had been inappropriate for the
site chosen (e.g., a 4 0 -story high-rise located in the middle of a residential area
of $200,000 houses). As the Seventh Circuit noted in its remand opinion, not
every action that produces discriminatory effects is prohibited by the Fair Housing Act.43 The two-step analysis created by Griggs and adopted in Rizzo is flexible enough to avoid serious hardships to Title VIII defendants and to accommodate their legitimate interests, but the burden of proving that these interests
are truly in jeopardy must first be carried by the defendant before the Fair
Housing Act can sanction practices with discriminatory effects.
The exclusionary zoning cases also suggest that the nature of the relief
sought may be relevant to the question of liability under Title VIII. Certainly
the defendant's burden of justification is easier to satisfy in a case where "the
plaintiff seeks to compel the defendant to construct integrated housing or take
affirmative steps to ensure that integrated housing is built than when the plaintiff
is attempting to build integrated housing on his own land and merely seeks to
enjoin the defendant from interfering with that construction." 43 ' In the former
case, the defendant is being asked to commit money, land, manpower, and other
limited resources to a project that it has decided is not justified. If this decision
is reasonably necessary to achieve the legitimate, nonracial purposes for which
it was allegedly made, Title VIII would not be violated regardless of the discriminatory effect it might cause. On the other hand, if the defendant is merely
427
428
429
430
431

See 517 F.2d at 415.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 415.
558 F.2d at 1290.
Id. at 1293; see note 394 supra.
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being asked to stop interfering with private efforts to help desegregate a community, its actions would be more difficult to justify, and properly so.
Even though the relief requested may be considered in determining whether
the Fair Housing Act has been violated, it is important to distinguish the issue of
liability under Title VIII from the issue of what relief is appropriate once
liability has been established. After a court determines that the defendant's
conduct amounts to a substantive violation of the law, it must then deal with the
separate question of what relief it should award. If the relief sought is equitable,
as it generally has been in the exclusionary zoning cases and in enforcement
actions brought by the Attorney General, the trial judge enjoys a certain amount
of discretion in granting or refusing relief.432 This traditional discretion of the
chancellor is explicitly recognized in the language of the private enforcement
section of Title VIII, which provides that "[t]he court may grant as relief, as it
deems appropriate, any permanent or temporary injunction, temporary restraining order, or other order. .

. ."'

Of course, withholding relief may amount

to an abuse of discretion in a particular case.4" 4 As a general matter, however,
the court in an equity case under Title VIII has discretion in shaping the relief
it orders. This discretion may well include the power to deny any relief if the
defendant's good faith is clearly established.43 Thus, a trial judge has discretion
under Title VIII to consider the relief requested in determining its award as well
as in deciding the merits of the claim.43 This fact reinforces the notion that an
effect test for fair housing cases need not be unduly rigid, nor ignore the defendant's legitimate interests or lack of discriminatory intent.437
It is not clear that the exclusionary zoning decisions have always recognized
the distinction between the merits of a Title VIII claim and the relief to be
awarded after a violation has been proved. 3 s Once again, however, the Rizzo
opinion correctly demonstrates how this should be done. Having determined
432

See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 98 S.Ct. 2279 (1978):
It is correct, of course, that a federal judge sitting as a chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law. This Court made
plain in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, that "[a] grant of jurisdiction to issue compliance
orders hardly suggests an absolute duty to do so under any and all circumstances."
As a general matter it may be said that "[s]ince all or almost all equitable remedies
are discretionary, the balancing of equities and hardships is appropriate in almost
any case as a guide to the chancellor's discretion." Dobbs, Remedies 52 (1973).
Id. at 2301 (citations omitted).
433 42 U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1970) (emphasis supplied).
434 See, e.g., United States v. Jamestown Center-in-the-Grove Apartments, 557 F.2d 1079
(5th Cir. 1977); 437 F.2d 221.
435 Cf. 98 S.Ct. at 1380-83. But see 422 U.S. at 421-23.
436 564 F.2d at 149; 558 F.2d at 1290.
437 The problem is more complicated if the relief sought is money damages. For one thing,
the Supreme Court has held that the discretion that exists regarding a back pay award under
Title VII is not available to the court under the Fair Housing Act. See 415 U.S. at 195, 197.
Even in the case of back pay under Title VII, the award should generally be made, regardless
of intent. See 422 U.S. at 421-23. Thus, a discriminatory effect case under the Fair Housing
Act should result in an award of money damages if they are proved. See 415 U.S. at 197.
Of course, the defendant's justification is still relevant to the question of whether Title VIII
has been violated, but once a violation has been established and actual damages have been
shown, the plaintiff is entitled to them regardless of the defendant's lack of discriminatory
motive.
438 See 558 F.2d at 1293.
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that the defendants' action in refusing to build the proposed development had a
racially discriminatory effect that was not shown to be justified, the Third
Circuit held that that action violated the Fair Housing Act." 9 Next, it considered the question of relief. The court of appeals upheld the trial judge's
order requiring the defendants to build the disputed project, but it decided that
the record did not support the lower court's additional requirement that the
defendants promptly submit a plan to integrate all of their public housing projects. 4 ' Thus, Rizzo demonstrates that Title VIII can result in a court order
requiring the defendant to build integrated housing,4"4' while at the same time
showing that the relief in such a case should be tailored to correcting the particular violation proved.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court has yet to decide a case on the merits under the Fair
Housing Act. In the decade since the law was passed, the lower courts have
struggled with a number of important housing discrimination issues, with a
notable lack of uniformity resulting from their decisions. While there is general agreement among the courts of appeals about the elements of a fair housing
case when the defendant's racial intent is at issue, the circuits have split concerning the proper treatment of a Title VIII case based solely on discriminatory
effect. The confusion has been compounded in suits against government defendants by the recent changes in the standards governing equal protection claims
and the corresponding changes in the relationship between federal civil rights
statutes and the Equal Protection Clause.
In the absence of any definitive Supreme Court interpretation of the Fair
Housing Act, many lower courts have sought guidance from Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. and other employment discrimination cases holding that practices
with discriminatory effects violate Title VII unless they are required by business necessity. In many respects, the analogy seems apt. The language of the two
statutes contains similar operative provisions, and the congressional concerns
underlying both extend beyond eradicating only purposeful discrimination. The
differences that do exist between housing and employment are not of a kind to
justify a fundamentally different interpretation of the substantive requirements
of Title VIII than Griggs gave to Title VII. Both laws are directed against the
consequences of racial discrimination, not merely its motivation. Experience in
the lower courts, however, has shown that the decision to apply Griggs to the
fair housing field is not a simple matter, and the confusion engendered by the
various approaches adopted by the circuit courts makes the question ripe for
consideration by the Supreme Court.
Most of the appellate decisions that have dealt with the purpose-or-effect
issue under Title VIII have done so in the context of exclusionary zoning suits
against local governments. The concept of discriminatory effect in these cases
439
440
441

564 F.2d at 149-50.
Id. at 150-53.
Cf. 558 F.2d at 1293.
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involves different considerations than it does in suits against private defendants,
but the exclusionary zoning decisions are still instructive of the lower courts'
attitude toward the more general issue of Title VIII's proper interpretation and
coverage. The most recent of these decisions, and the most sophisticated, is
Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, where the Third Circuit relied on Griggs in an
exclusionary zoning suit, but noted that the special problems of fair housing
litigation, particularly those concerning relief and the defendant's justification,
required a delicate case-by-case approach in using an effect standard under
Title VIII.
Perhaps the most important result of applying Griggs to the fair housing
field would be in cases where the defendant's motive is at issue. To date, most
private suits under Title VIII and § 1982 have been disparate treatment cases
in which the key question is why the defendant refused to deal with a minority
homeseeker. Griggs would reduce the chances that a discriminating defendant
could escape liability by requiring that he prove that his excuse for not renting
or selling to the plaintiff was in fact reasonably necessary for business purposes.
Income-related requirements' recommendations from current residents, and other
screening standards that appear legitimate and racially neutral, but are discriminatory in operation, should be prohibited unless they are shown to accurately measure an individual's qualifications as a housing consumer.
Applying the lessons of Griggs and other Title VII decisions to issues such
as the burden of proof and the value of statistical evidence in Title VIII cases
will help the Fair Housing Act combat sophisticated as well as blatant discrimination. Beyond the benefits of an effect standard in proving disparate treatment
cases, however, is the question of whether a facially neutral housing practice
that was really instituted for nonracial reasons should ever be held to violate
Title VIII. The cases in which such a claim has been made are rare. The "big"
private housing case, unlike the big employment case, has yet to become common,
but the success of the discriminatory effect theory in a number of exclusionary
zoning cases may mean that it will occur more often now. When it does, the
Fair Housing Act, like Title VII, should be held to condemn arbitrary and unnecessary practices that operate to limit housing opportunities for minorities.
Once these barriers are down, the congressional goal of an open, integrated
society will be available to homeseekers of all races, and it will be up to them to
achieve it.

